The metaphysics of Henri Bergson; by Powell, Webster Hezekiah
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1915
The metaphysics of Henri Bergson;
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/16578
Boston University


THE METAPHYSICS OF HENRI ERGSOK
A Criticism according
to the Philosophy of
Borden P . Bowne
By
«» nB S TtiR HEZEEIAH P 0WELL
(A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1898;
S.T.B., Boston University, 1903)
A Dissertation
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
GtiUDUaIE school
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
19 15

?h-D
1 115
P

THE M E T A P H Y 5 I-C 3 Q_ F HEN R I BERGSON
A Or it cisrt\
1
2
Strategic
Points of
( 1 )
( 2 )
analysis
points in philosophy according to Bowne .
departure, Pacts of experience.
Bergson: Change, movement, becoming.
Bowne: (a) coexistence of persons, (b) common
law of reason, (c) world of common
experience .
With Bergson impersonal or unpersonal facts
prominent, with Bowne, personal facts.
1 - Reality
1 - What is reality? How shall we think of reality?
2 - Bergson says it is duration, that is, real concrete
time. This distinguished from ideal or abstract
time
.
3 - Concrete time or duration the most real, substantial,
resistant thing we know. It is the very stuff of
reality, the very stuff of the psychical life. (C.E.4)
4 - Nature of duration. It is the continuous nrogreds
of the past into -the future, it gnaws into the
future and swells as it advances. "For a conscious
being to exist is to change, to change is to mature,
to mature is to go on creating one’s self endlessly" .
Burat ion is what each us apprehends when he
reflects on his own conscious life, a process of
change in which none of the parts are external to one
another but interpenetrate
,
interpermeate ; the past
is carried on into the present. There is no
repetition but continual creation of what is new.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016
https://archive.org/details/metaphysicsofhenOOpowe
5 - This principle of duration in the inorganic as
well as in the organic. The universe endures.
All is change, flow, continuous becoming. Any
other view is due to intellect which deals with
the inert, reduces all to the static.
6 - Radical mechanism and radical finalism (the
latter being but radical mechanism, reversed) are
both rejected because they conflict with duration.
Bowne’s criticism and rejection of mechanism more
logical and effective because of his mightier
arguments on the personal plane. Their criticisms
of Spencer.
7 - Radical finalism rejected as making growth and new
departures impossible. Way for novelties left so
wide open by Bergson that anything may happen.
Capriciousness .
8 - Duration, as very stuff of reality, as creative
force or principle, gradually gives place to vital
impetus as creative force or principle. Vital
impulse or cosmic elan defined. (C.E.8?)
9 - Duration as time becomes more and more abstract,
formal time. Approaching Bowne’s idea of time
as a mental form.
10 - Vital, impulse or cosmic elan rushing, pushing,
shooting out, somehow interrupted. Two currents:
ascending, spiritual current; and descending,
material current,. These two in conflict. j-deal
genesis of matter. Creation described and
illustrated by rising and falling rockets and rising
live steorni and falling condensed steam. The vital
imnulse as a. center or continuity of shooting
out. ( C .E. 24?- 8
)
11 - The impersonal nature of all this in spite of the
personal terms used. Consequent insufficiency.
12 - individual ity and bodily organism. Eergson’s
individuality is physical not spiritual as Powne’s.
13 - Intellect and the descending current. Intellect
formed to deal with matter. It thinks matter
r
14 - Bowne’s personal explanation of reality and creation.
Active intelligence as only sufficient explanation
of reality and knowledge.
Immanence and transcendence of the personal world-
ground. Ward's illustration of the immanence and
transcendence of the world ground or creator. This
Bowne’s idea. He does not attempt as Bergson to
giv a recipe of creation.

15 - Bowne's summary of the nature and sufficiency
of personality as world ground* (Metaphysics,
p. In-112)
16 - Bergson’s a strung along universe". Pluralistic.
Problem of interaction. Bowne’s a monistic, personal
universe .
1? - Relation of human personalities to the personal
world ground. Freedom and necessity in the
systems of Bergson and Eowne.

II 'heory of Knowledge
1 - Bergson's theory of knowledge closely related
to his theory of reality.
2 - Three faculties of knowledge, instinct, intellect,
intuition. Their relation, not unilinear hut
separate .
B - Nature of intellect. To think matter. Formed
to deal with matter, as inert, static. Snapshots.
It cannot know life as living, moving, changing.
Intellect and science.
4 - Intuition. By this faculty we know the living,
moving, 'becoming. It is intellectual sympathy.
Plunging into the vital current, living rather than
thinking or reflecting. Knowing the elan from
within rather than externally. This experience
rare and brief. In it we are free. Proa it
are formed intellectual concepts.
5 - Intuition of matter. Perception, pure and
concrete. Pure perception is in the object, not
in us. Bridging the chasm between soul and body,
mind and matter, philosophy and science. Eut
interaction possivle only by immanent action of
the One, the world ground.
6 - Intuition as self annihilation. False mysticism.
Nirvana. Knowledge reduced to undifferentiated
feeling .
? - Bowne's theory of knowledge closely related to his
his theory of reality. The universe is intelligible
because it is grounded in active intelligence.
8 - Failure of empiricism. No unitary, active, abiding
self or ego. Ego rejected by Bergson.
9 - Failure of apridorism. Subjectivity anc relativity
of knowledge.
10 - Bowne’s summary of his theory of knowledge.
( "Personalism"* p. 110-111 .
)
Knowledge by activity
of mind according to constitutive and intuitive
principles, the categories. Nature of categories
(Personalism p. 100-102) Intelligence is funda-
mental, explains all, even the categories, and is
itself inexplicable.
11 - Objective and subjective validity of the categories.
Kant's failure by making them only subjective. His
relativity of knowledge and agnosticism. Bovne
replaces Kant's phenomena and unknowable noumena by
phenomena and their cause which is active intelligence
and hence knowable as acting, creating.
t
12 -Bowne does not, as Bergson, limit intelligence and
bring in another faculty. His partition of territor
between science and philosophy. Knowledge in both
territories by active intelligence which includes
intellect, sensibility and will. Not different
faculties demanded but different purpose of faculties
in these two territories. Bowne avoids Bergson's
fatal dualism.
13- Knowledge of the living, moving, changing, only
by the abiding self. Thought of change vs. change
in thought .
14- He rejects bare, meager intellectualism as much as
Bergson does. But it is result of superficial use
of active intelligence and does not demand another
faculty to overcome it. Knowledge of personality
by personality, of the living by active intelligence.

1** - Change and Identity
1 - Bergson’s system has been called the philosophy
of change, and he the modern Heraclitus. All
is change, flow. Seeming fixity due to spatial-
izing tendency of intellect which reduces all to the
static. Bowne’s recognition of change. necessity
of change.
2 - There is also the experience and idea of identity,
permanence. This, too, necessary 7-. The Ileraclitics
and Eleatics. Truth in both.
3 - Bergson emphasizes change ana makes no sufficient
provision for permanence. To keep way open for
change, progress, novelties, he makes anything and
everything possible and probable. All is becoming.
4 - Provision must be made for both change and
permanence to satisfy experience. But on the
impersonal plane it becomes all one or the other.
5 - Problem can be solved only on personal plane to
which Bergson has nor yet come. In personality
we have self equality throughout the changing
experience
.
6 - God's changelessness consists not in ontological
rigidity but in the constancy and continuity of
the laws of His states and changes. Change and
indentity in Goa as in human persons is found in the
extraordinary power of personality.
u

IV - The Self
1 - According to Bergson the self is furation, it is
a succession of interpenetrating states, His
two selves in one. (T. F. W.)
8 - Self as snowball. Ego rejected as fiction, a
thread to string states on (C. E. )
3 - His self is successive states of consciousness.
States of consciousness are the self. Bowne
holds states of consciousness and consciousness
impossible without a unitary, active, abiding self
or ego.
4 - The ego Bergson has put out comes back. He
smuggles in the unitary abiding self. His
abstraction, continuity, is not sufficient to
bind these states into unity. The two selves.
Fatal pluralism.
5 - Same conclusion reached by criticism of self as
snowball, no unity. A mass of states
.
Ho individuality except in bodily organism which
breaks to pieces.
6 - Self as snowball weighted by past and self as rill
from life current is a determined, necessitated
self
.
? - Bowne' s self, unitary, active, abiding person,
creamed by the personal world-ground who is free,
provides for unity and knowledge and freedom.
This self or person may live a superficial, poor
earthy life or a deep, rich spiritual life, but
it is not two or many selves.

V - Space and Time
SPACE
1 - Is space an aspect of physical qualities of matter
or is it a distinct reality? Bowne holds former
view, Bergson the latter. " "Space is reality with
no quality". (T. F. ¥, 95) But a homogeneous,
qualityless, medium or reality is nothing, 'becomes
zero
.
2 - homogeneous, qualityless, space and homogeneous,
qualityless, time (abstract time) identified. hence
abstract time is zero. Bowne does not hold them
identical or zero. They are not delusions.
3 - Space stripped of all qualities still held real.
This would be the fiction of pure being.
4 - In "hatter and Memory" "and "Creative Evolution" 1 '
space is "a wholly ideal diagram", "a mental schema".
Thus Bergson approaches Bowne* s position of space as
form of mental experience. homogeneous time is called
"a diagrammatic design of succession in general".
Approaches Bowne’ s position.
5 - Attempted distinction between abstract space and
concrete space. "Outside me" is real or concrete
space, "within me" is abstract space. But "me" is
not spatial.
6 - Bergson’s theory of space manageable only as it
approaches Bowne ’s theor^r. bpace not real, nor a
delusion, but is phenomenal, a form of mental
experience. Bowne* s position. (Metaphysics 153-154)
TIME
1 - Abstract or ideal time, and real or concrete time or
duration. Former is bastard time, it is spatial and
is reducible to space.
2 - Duration is very stuff of reality, most suvstantial
and resistant thing we know
. Duration gives place
to vital impetus or cosmic elan. Duration as" time
more and more becomes form of elan's activity -
Approaches Bowne 's position. Time a form of mental
experience
.

3 - Vital impulse becomes more sufficient only as it
approaches active intelligence. Will Bergson
reach the personal plane?
4 - Bowns’s summary of his theory of time as phenomenal
reality, a mental form of experience. (Metaphysics 193)
This the only tenable position. It saves us from the
problems and difficulties of pluralism, and of the
One and the many.
<

VI - Freedom and hecessity
1 - According to Bergson, freedom must be thought of in
terras of time, not of space. Domination of spat i? lining
intellect means necessity. be are free when we live,
endure, not when we think, reflect. Freedom drops as
over-ripe fruit from our whole life.
2 - Freedom as over-ripe fruit in contrast with Kant’s
and Bonne’s idea of freedom as spontaneity, self
determination, choice, effort.
3 - Freedom in rare, brief moments when we endure, when
we plunge into vital current. This is self
annihilation, all determined in us and for us as
over-ripe fruit.
4 - Freedom and law.
5 - Vital impulse as limited, finite, determined from
without, hence necessitated, which means a system of
necessity. Bowne’s world ground is infinite and
free. It is personal.
6 - Freedom a necessity of thought. Problem of error can-
not be solved in a system of necessity.
7 - Freedom a necessity of morality. Problem of right
and wrong. Bergson has been challenged to write
his system of ethics. • What must, it be?

VII - GOD
1
- Bergson's belief in God. (LeRoy 824) His idea
of God. (C .E. 248-249) God as continuity of
shooting out, unceasing flow, be coining. An evolving
God, without plan or purpose. A limited, finite
God .
8 - He is not an atheist, but his idea of God not Bovne's
idea. God as Father.
3 - His God is impersonal. Personality means self
consciousness and self direction. His limited,
finite God is determined, mechanical.
4 - .Man not teleologically an end but only a terminal
point to date. Both God end man yet becoming.
Know not what they shall be.
5 - Bowne's idea of G-od - Personal, infinite, Father
the God of the prophets and of Jesus. Men are
His children in whom He is seeking to perfect the
filial life.
6 - God has a plan for the whole. His plan is subject
to His control. Pie works freely in His universe.
? - Optimism and hope are possible. Argument from the
incarnation.
8 - This God is knowable as person knows person, and
friend knows friend. Fellowship with God.
d - Yielding 'to Him is not seif annihilation but fulness
of personal life and individuality.
/
VIII - Immortality
1 - Quotations from. Bergson, stating his views of
life and death. (C. E. 245, 24? note, 269, 271)
2 - Teaching of these passages: Preexistence of souls
in vital current as rills in a river. Bodily
individuality. Vital current indifferent to soul’s
bodily existence. Human beings trying to ride
down and out-ride physical death. So far not
possible. Hope - An everlasting bodily existence,
or reabsorption in vital current. Possible re-
incarnation in plant, animal or human being.
3 - Bowne’s idea of immortality. God as person, Father.
Human beings His created children. Individuality
not bodily but spiritual. Body as instrument of soul.
Existence of soul apart from body possible and
probable .

Bergson and Social I rob lens-
1 - What has he to say of the problems of society, their
cause, nature, solution? He has spoken on this
subject in his address on the European War.
2 - His address before French Academy of Moral and
iolitical Sciences.
o - The two currents in conflict. The allies are the
ascending, spiritual cur ent, and Germany is the
descending, material current. It is conflict of
spirit with matter.
4 - "Germany predestined to make the venture". Are
not allies also predestined? His system of
necessity .
5 - Outlook dark for allies according to Bergson's theory
of matter. Spirit has not so far had much success
in dealing with matter.
6 - Such doubtless his interpretation of all other social
problems, conflict of spirit with matter, two mighty
forces, without plan, contending for modus vivendi.
Two blind Samsons fighting. hot much hope.
? - Bowne refers all to a God who is Father. Matter
and spirit both are His and He is able to make them
work together for good. Human beings are His
children. It is the God of Bowne and not Bergson
who makes possible the Lord's prayer.
- Elements of Value in Bergson's Philosophy
'.
1THE METAPHYSICS OP HENRI BERGSON
INTRODUCTION
In the preface of his "Personalism 1 ’ Dr. Bowne writes these
comprehensive words: "The strategic points in our intellectual
campaigns lie in our epistemology and metaphysics. Our notions
of knowledge and its nature, our conception of reality and cau-
sality, our thoughts of space and time - the two great intimi-
dating phantoms - these are the things that decide our general
way of thinking and give direction to our thought even in morals
and religion"
.
(Personalism, page Vlll).
In accordance with this principle we shall attempt a com-
parison of the philosophies of Professor Henri Bergson and Pro-
fessor Borden Parker Bowne. These will be the points of consid-
eration, for these, according to Dr. Bowne, determine all else in
philosophical systems. To go into detail would mean to rewrite
their philosophies in full.
Points of Departure .
Both men base their systems on experience. Their purpose
is to explain, interpret, experience.
Bergson starts from the fact of change, movement, becoming.
This must be recognized everywhere . "Change in all around we
see". Even what seems the most static and inert is found to
change. Science now holds that atoms and electrons, its final
divisions of matter, are not inert particles but centers of change
movement, action. Prom this universal fact of experience as fun
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damental Bergson starts to work out his system which is called
"The Philosophy of Change". He has been called the modern Hera-
clitus. We can see something of' the end from the beginning.
Bowne takes as the fundamental facts of experience for his
starting point: (1) The coexistence of persons, (2) The law of
reason, valid for all and binding upon all, (3) A world of common
experience, actual or possible, where we meet in mutual under-
standing and where the great business of life goes on. Here as
in Bergson we can see the end from the beginning.
Bergson starts from the fact of change which, in and of it-
self, is no more personal than impersonal so far as spontaneous
thought is concerned. It is not as a personal fact that Eergson
recognizes it but rather as impersonal or at best unpersonal.
Hor has he yet reached personality as the fundamental cause of
this change, movement, becoming.
Bowne starts with the personal and ends with the personal as
the only sufficient explanation of experience, even the fact of
change, which he also recognizes everywhere. He once said of
Bergson that he had not yet reached the personal plane but was go-
ing in that direction and would come to it. Bergson is trying to
explain the personal in terms of the infra-personal or supra-per-
sonal. Bowne holds that the personal, the supreme fact of expe-
rience, can be explained only in terms of the personal. The out-
standing terms in Bergson’s system are "change", "movement," "be-
coming", "creative evolution", "duration", "vital impulse",
"intuition"; in Bowie's system, "personal", "personality", "active
intelligence"
,
"personalism"
.
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3l . Theory of Reality
What is reality? What is the fundamental or causal
ground of the facts of experience? How shall we think of real-
ity? Bergson would answer that it is duration
,
that is, concrete
or real time, which must he distinguished from abstract or mathe-
matical time. The former is the very stuff and cause of every-
thing. The latter is inefficient, it is formal.
Of real time or duration he says, "There is no stuff more
resistant nor more substantial". "It is just the stuff the psy-
chical life is made of". Cur duration is not merely one instant
replacing another; if it were there would never be anything but the
present - no prolonging the past into the actual, no evolution, no
concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the
past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.
And as the past grows without ceasing so also there is no limit to
its preservation". "My mental state as it advances on the road
of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accu-
mulates; it goes on increasing --- roiling upon itself as a snow-
ball on the snow - - - the past follows us at every instant; all
that we have felt, thought, and willed from our earliest infancy
is there leaning over the present whcih is about to join it, press-
ing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it
outside. What are we in fact, what is our character, if not the
condensation of the history we have lived from our birth - nay,
even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions?"
"For a conscious being to exist is to change, to change is to mature,
to mature is to go on creating one’s self endlessly." "Continuity
'-
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4of change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration -
the living being seems to share these attributes with consciousness .
Can we go further and say that life, like conscious activity, is in-
vention, is increasing creation?" Plis idea of duration is what
each of us is said to apprehend when he reflects on his own conscious
life, a process of change in which none of the parts are external to
one another, but interpenetrating, interpermeating
,
where the past is
carried on into the present, where therefore there is no repetition,
but a continual creation of what is new.
As the organic endures so does the inorganic endure.
"Succession is an undeniable fact even in the material world, as if
it occupied duration like our own. If I want to mix a glass of sug-
ar and water I must willy nilly wait until the sugar melts. This
feet is big with meaning." "The universe endures." (Creative
Evolution, pages 8, 4, 5, ?, 9-10, 23). Duration, i.e., real, con-
crete time, bites into things, leaves on them its marks. It is
real, for that which does something is real. What does nothing is
nothing. Duration is creative evolution. From this it is seen
that Bergson explains change, movement, becoming, creative evolution
as duration, duration is the efficient agent. It produces all
things. It is reality. Reality is not solid matter nor thinking
mind but duration, creating, evolving. life is duration. All is
unceasing becoming which preserves the past and creates the present.
The solid things which seem to abide, to resist the flowing, the
biting, of duration, are periods, cuts across the flowing, views,
snapshots, which the intellect takes of the ceaselessly moving,
flowing reality for practical purposes, for eventual action. This
(l
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5is the characteristic of intellect. It is for action. It has
been produced by the mind to deal with matter in this practical way.
Duration, life, is more than intellect. Intellect is its instru-
ment. It relates to the past, the done not the do ing . It is re-
flective, dealing with the has been
,
not the being
,
the created not
the creating
,
the inert
,
not the living
,
moving
,
becoming . Duration,
this real, concrete time, this living, moving, changing, becoming
process and force, flowing, rushing, pushing on, this creative evolu-
tion, produces all things. It is absolute, a flowing that is con-
tinuous through all, in all, over all. It is never repeated, is ir- ^
reversible, always present. Duration or concrete time is the most Au-
real, persistent, substantial stuff we know. In it and through it •
and of it all persons and things have their being. Real time as du-
ration is causal, productive.
Radical mechanism and radical finalism (the latter, he says, is
but radical mechanism reversed) are rejected, because they conflict
with duration. In mechanism of either form all is given; the only
thing that happens is the making explicit the implicit. There are
no new departures, no new beginnings, no change, no becoming, no pro-
gress. There is only repetition, a shuffling of terms. Physics
and chemistry can never explain life. It is interesting to students
of Bowne to find Bergson coming to the same conclusion as to the in-
sufficiency of mechanism. But his logic can not be as resistless
as Bowne* s because he has not the mighty arguments of personalism to
put against it. Whatever duration may be it savors of the impersonal^
and mechanical and can not meet the demands as active intelligence
si}
does. As Bowne so conclusively shows, the only producing cause ?Te
know or can conceive is personality. But Bergson's duration is not
*<
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6personality under another name. Bergson would call it supra- ^
personal. It would seem to he infra-personal. It produces per- /V'
sonality and all things else. According to Bowne what is not per-
sonal is mechanical. To talk of the suprapersonal is to indulge
in mere words.
Of the Spencerian system which Bowne so effectively demolished,
showing it to he only a verbal shuffle, a fallacy of the universal,
merely an ipse dixit of its author, Bergson says: "The usual device
of the Spencerian method consists in reconstructing evolution with
the fragments of the evolved. If I paste a picture on a card and
then cut up the card into hits, I can reproduce the picture hy
rightly grouping again the small pieces, and the child who, work-
ing thus with pieces of a puzzle, and putting together unformed
fragments of the picture, finally obtains a pretty colored design,
no doubt imagines that he has produced design and color. So hy com-
bining together the most simple results of evolution, you may imitate
well or ill the most complete effects; hut of neither the simple or
complex will you have retraced the genesis, and the addition of
evolved to evolved will hear no resemblance whatever to the movement
of evolution." (C. E. 364).
This is a clear and excellent putting of the Spencerian method
and makes its insufficiency, its failure, evident. But Bergson has
not the sufficient metaphysic to put in its place that Bowne had
when he exposed the fallacy of Snencer's system. If it requires a
person to put the parts together to give the design and color, much
more did it certainly require a person, an active intelligence
,
to
produce, to create the original. Real time, pushing and rushing
.\ •
'
.
' r
?along, is entirely inadequate even to assemble the parts, far less
to produce the original whole in all its beauty of design and color.
A person, intelligent and active, is the only force or agency in
which we can rest satisfied as sufficient for this.
Radical finalism is likewise rejected as being radical mech-
anism reversed. The one is pushed from behind, the other pulled
from before, and both are equally mechanical and determined. In
both cases all is given; creation and production are ruled out as
impossible. But he acknowledges he is more friendly to finalism
than to mechanism, yet theoretically he is really as much against
mechanism in this form a.s in the first, for both are mechanism to
him. However, he talks of motives and refers to the mind’s pro-
ducing intellect to deal with matter. He cannot do otherwise.
A system of reality just rushing on without any plan, ourpose or
direction is worse than a rushing train without tracks or engineer.
It certainly would make new departures but of what kind? Bergson’s
duration or real time pushing along certainly throws the gates of the
future open, but so open that anything may happen. Mechanism may
have gone to the extreme in closing them for sake of order and law
and certainty, but Bergson certainly errs in the opposite direction.
«
But he can not do betwer, for active, intelligent personality alone
can meet the need, and duration is not that. Bowne’s system,
grounded in personality, can overcome the difficulties of mechanism
and open the gates of the future for safe and sane evolution and crea-
tion with new departures worth while. Active intelligence works
with a plan and purnose, but its plan and purpose are its own and are
its own and are subject to its control. It determines the plan and
purpose, not vice versa. With Bergson’s duration, pushing, changin g,

becoming, evolving, finalism in any form is as difficult as the
most radical mechanism. Bergson, like Bowne, has felt the limi-
tations and insufficiency of the scientific or mathematical method
in deiaing with the problems of life. It, can deal only with the
static, the given, the mechanical, but life is moving, growing,
changing, becoming, and a way must be opened in our thought to per-
mit this. So he repudiates science and mechanism as insufficient,
as Bowne does, and, to be sure to open the way, he depreciates intel-
lect which inhis mind is wholly identified with science and mech-
anism. He seizes upon the fact of movement, change, becoming, and
gives it right of way, turns it loose with no plan or purpose to hin-
der it. On it rushes without plan or purpose, so that orderly re-
sults Bergson would hardly find strewn along the track. Ho theory
of order (C. E. 020), which he is at so much pains and labor to give
us, would be able to discover order in what a rushing, pushing system
without plan or purpose would produce, unless chaos is order. This
certainly is not the straight and narrow way. Bergson’s system will
noL allow plan unless the end is fixed from the beginning, unless ali
is foreseen, Predetermined, which is mechanism indeed. nothing less
than free personality can solve the problem of finalism and we are
conscious every day that it does it and guarantees our freedom thereby.
On the impersonal plane it is complete homogeneity or complete hetero-
geneity, both of witch are unmanageable.
As Bergson progresses through "Time and Tree Will" on into
"Creative Evolution", duration or real time, as the very stuff of
reality, ohe most real, resistant and substantial stuff we know, more
and more changes its form or gives place to "elan vital" or vital
impulse. Duration at first is interpermeation of states, it is

9continuity, it is time. Pure duration is defined in "Time and
Tree Will" as a succession of qualitative changes, which mingle and
interpenetrate, which have no precise boundaries and no tendency to
separate from one another, no kinship with number. It is then pure
heterogeneity. As soon as we attribute the least homogeneity to du-
ration we introduce space. as Hermann says, "Bergson has a strung-
along universe." In the very first pages of "Creative Evolution" we
read of "duration gnawing into the future" (pg. 5). This duration
b ites into things and leaves the marks of its teeth on them. It is
more and more forceful and energetic. "The personality shoots
,
grows
and ripens without ceasing." (pg. 6). "To mature is to create one’s
self endlessly", (pg. ?). "if I want to dissolve sugar in a glass of
water I mast willy nilly wait" (pg. 9). "Wherever anything lives ther
is open somewhere a register in which time is being inscribed . " (pg.
16) . "The impetus which causes a living being to grow larger, to
develop and to age is the same (impetus) that has caused it to pass
through the phases of the embryonic life", (pg. 18). This impetus
becomes more and more prominent as the generating cause or force un-
til we are fully introduced to it as "an original impetus of life
passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of
germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval be-
tween the generations. This impetus, sustained right along the lines
of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of
variations, at least of those that are regularly passed, that accumu-
late and create new species." (pg. 8?). This is the vital impulse.
When we come to the greatest chapter of Bergson’s writings (C. E.
Chapter ill) we have this vital impulse, "elan vital", contending

10
in two surging currents as the creative power or agency. The tem-
poral feature of duration is more and more subordinated, even
though the term duration may be retained. The cosmic "elan" chang-
ing, pushing, creating, producer us and a.ll things else. Duration now
figures as a form conditioning the creative efficiency of the "elan",
very much as, in Bowne, time is the form of inner experience. Dura-
tion as time remains as abstract time, a mental form or schema. He
does not ascribe consciousness or unconsciousness to this elan. Fe
talks about consciousness in general but does not tell us what lie
means, for who can tell what it means?
This mighty life current, or viral impetus, rushing, pushing
,
somehow, we are not told why or how, has been interrupted and turned
upon itself and against, itself so that, there are now two currents,
the ascending one and the descending one. The ascending one is
spirit. The descending one is matter. The ascending current is
as fiery, blazing rockets shooting upward. The descending current
is as rockers burned out, black, falling. The rising rockets illu-
minate and try to revivify and turn back the falling black rockets.
So the ascending current of spirit meets the descending current of
matter or space, and tries to introduce into ir again as much in de-
termination as possible, tries to turn it back, tries to convert it to
ascending current again, tries ro spiritualize it. These two currents
are opposed to one another. Spirit lusteth against flesh, and flesh
against spirit. The tendency of the descending current is infra-
personal and the tendency of the ascending current is supra-personal
.
Consciousness and personality as identified with bodily organisms are
produced dt their point of conflict.
Although wis seeking to derive personality, yet he is constantly
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bringing in the qualities of personality, for only so can he make
this cosmic elan sufficient to explain the universe and experience.
Duration as real time was not equal to the task and vital impulse
has been brought in. Will this, divided somehow into two mighty,
op-nosing, contending currents like two blind gianLs in conflict, be
sufficient to account for all life, thought and personality, all ex-
perience? To state the problem seems sufficient answer. Eowne
says it never will be sufficient. It is mechanism over again, and
Bergson* s arguments against mechanism apply against his own system.
'•This extension ,matter
,
appears as tension which is interrupted.
The direction which this reality takes suggests to us the idea of a
thing unmaking itself; which no doubt is one of the essential charac-
ters of materiality. What conclusion are we to draw from all this
if not that by the process by which this thing (ascending current)
makes itself is directed in the contrary way to that of physical pro-
cesses and that it is therefore by its very definition immaterial.
All our analyses show us, in life, an e fort to remount the incline
that matter descends. In that they reveal to us the possibility, the
necessity even, of a process the inverse of materiality, creative of
matter by its interruption alone. The life that evolves on the sur-
face of our planet is indeed attached to matter. If it were pure
consciousness, a fortiori if if were supra-consciousness
,
it would be
pure creative activity. In fact it is riveted to an organism that
subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything
happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from these
laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical
changes. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force would behave
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which, left, to itself, would work in the inverse direction.
Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downwards
,
it
succeeds in retarding it. The evolution of life really continues
as initial impulsion." (0. S. 245-6 passim). This process of the
ideal genesis of matter is compared to "a vessel full of steam, at
a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through
which steam ie escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air
nearly all condensed into little drops which fall hack, and this
condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something,
an interruption, a deficit. ("The real can pass from tension to
extension and from freedom to mechanical necessity hy way of inver-
sion." (C. E. 236)." But a small part of the jet of steam
subsists, uncondensed hr some seconds; it is making an effort to raise
the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their
fall. So from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing
out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world. The evo-
lution of living species within this world represents what subsists o^
the primitive direction of the original jet, and of our impulsion
which continues itself in a direction the inverse of materiality.
But let us not carry too far this comparison. It gives us but a
feeble and even deceptive image of realit}?-, for the crack, the jet
of steam, the forming of the drops, are determined necessarily,
whereas the creation of a world is a free act, and the life within
the world participates in this liberty. Let us think rather of an
action like that of raising the arm; then let us suppose that the
arm left to itself, falls back, and yet that there subsists in it,
striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates
it. In this image of a creative action which unmakes itself we have
(I
\
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already a more exact representation of matter. In vital activity
we see then, that which subsists of the direct movement in the in-
verted movement, a reality which is making i tself in a reality
which , is unmaking itself 11 . (C. 2. 247). True, it is evident how
mechanical and necessitated all is in this comparison. But he says
that the creation o * the world, in distinction from This crack and
the jets of steam, is a free act. And the dropped arm struggling
in vain to rise again is supposed to come nearer the truth and bring
out the freedom of it, however the limp helpless arm struggling in
vain to rise does not help us to feel or see freedom here. This com-
parison of the steam jet, the falling arm, the falling rockets are so
closely connected with his system that to reject them as mechanical
is to reject the system as such. If they are necessitated so is the
system. This is all the more apparent when in immediate connection
with this he tells us his idea of God and Creation. "If I consider
the world in which v;e live I find that the automatic and strictly
determined evolution of this well knit whole is action which is un-
making itself, and that the unforeseen forms which life cuts out in
it, forms capable of being themselves prolonged into unforeseen
movements, represent the action that is making itself. Now, if the
same kind of action is going on everywhere throughout the universe
as we have every reason to believe it is, whether it is that which is
unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake it-
self, I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a
centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks dis-
play - provided, however, that I do not present This centre as a
thing but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus defined, h&s
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nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, free-
dom"
. ( C . E . 248)
.
The impersonal nature of this God and of the process of crea-
tion is so evident, that, in spite of the fact that he refers to it
all as unceasing life, action, freedom, it cannot he made personal
by words ascribing qualities to it which its nature denies it. If
the comparison of the boiler, the crack and the jet of steam was im-
personal and necessitated, so surely is this centre of shooting out,
this continuity of flowing with worlds dropping as exhausted, condensed
steam, this rushing and pushing on, with no direction or purpose except
against something that interrupts it and turns i t upon itself and agair
itself. Force and motion which is all we have are not sufficient to
constitute personality and explain experience. If it had not been a
system of mechanical necessity before, it certainly has been converted
into one by this interrupter. If we are looking for freedom and infir
ity, we must turn to this interrupter, but of this we know nothing.
This is the great unknowable of Bergson's system. Eut it is responsi-
ble for the world of persons and things. here is the real "thing in
itself", which cannot be known except as an interrupter. The facts
are, that when we begin to look at what Bergson has been telling us in
these fine rhetorical passages and beautiful images and word pictures,
we discover that we have been treated to a display of verbal fireworks
,
as in Spencer’s famous definition of evolution, which Bowne long a^o
exposed and demolished. how insufficient this continuity of shooting/
out is to explain and interpret experience, is evident when we bring
to it the world of persons and personal needs. Bergson says, "Creatio
so conceived is not a mystery: we experience it in ourselves when we
act freely." But we are persons, and persons, according to Bergson
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are somehow created, or result when these two opposing currents of
life, ascending and descending, come into conflict with one another.
So that personality and individuality are by him associated with our
bodily organisms. ( . S. 259). Personality is a result and not the W
cause. If this "continuity of shooting out" has personality it is
somehow thrust inx-o it by the mighty interrupter which it met, and at
the same time it as made a system of necessity. He speaks of this
vital current as consciousness in general, but here again he uses a
meaningless phrase. It is not until consciousness is identified with
personality ana individuality that it has tangible meaning, and this
does not happen in his system until these two currents are brought into
conflict by the interrupter. Bergson is still on the impersonal plane
and in the toils of mechanism from which in vain he seeks to escape.
The argument he uses against mechanism is applicable to his own system.
To deal with the descending current of mattep, the vital impulse
or cosmic elan has devised ana produced intellect as an instrument
which at best deals with it in a very mechanical and superficial way.
To say that there was any plan or purpose in the elan's doing this is
to introduce final ism, hence mechanism, according to Bergosn. Intellec
and matter are somehow progressively adapted to one another. But
more of this later.
Borne starts
;
as '.e have already seen,,with persons and personal re-
lations instead of impersonal movement of change as does Eergson. Per-
sonality, active intelligence, according to Bowne, is the only fundamen-
tal, substantial reality that ve know or experience. Space, time,
matter, force, motion are all examined anc show themselves insufficient
to explain reality or interpret experience. They point beyond them-
selves for their ground. They must be transcended to be explained.
They are entirely trustworthy, but none of them alone nor all of them
t1 r
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together are sufficient to explain reality. So instead of rejecting
these as illusions because of their insufficiency, we transcend them
to find their cause and the only cause that is sufficient to save them
and make them intelligible is personality or active intelligence. They
have no meaning in and apart from sue! intelligence. These are real in
the sense that they are not illusions
,
but they are not real in the
sense of substantiality. Hence, Bowne divides reality into phenomenal
and ontological. Ontological reality is personal and causal. It is
the ground or cause of phenomenal reality. So that Bowne makes the
fundamental reality of the universe personal. It is active intelli-
gence, and, as personal, it is free, self-conscious, self-directing, for
you can explain the experience of freedom, self-consciousness, self-
direction, personality, only by personality. We may transcend per-
sonality in imagination but it is vain and empty imagination; it is
*
intellectual caprice. Personality and personality alone, unless we
want to deny the trustworthiness of our own experience and pronounce
all a delusion, is the fundamental real in which we can rest as suf-
ficient. Active intelligence explains all and it, itself, is inex-
plicable. Bowne does not attempt to give us a recipe of creation, as
does Bergson. He refers it to personality immanent and transcendent
and that is as far as we can go. That is sufficient. Ward, in his
"Realm of Ends"
,
thinks we can get an idea of creation by an immanent
and transcendent creator from the creator and creation of a great lit-
erary or musical creation. Bowne would agree with Ward in this illus-
tration. As he himself was wont to say, the immanent and transcendent
creator sustains to his creation something of the relation of a thinke
to his thoughts. But he is satisfied to have r< ached personality, ac-
*.
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tive intelligence as the world ground and leave all there. Of
course here is mystery, but we always find mystery when we are face
to face with the fundamentals of life. However there is a choice
between mysteries. Bowne thus has a One that is sufficient for all
the demands of the many and saves himself iron pluralism that more
and more must come into Bergson's system before it is workable and,
once in, this pluralism makes his system unmanageable, unworkable,
powne has a wonderful summary of his system in his metaphysics, (pg.
111-112) which must be given in his own language, "That the world
ground must be conceived as free active intelligence is the result to
which thought continually comes, whatever the line of investigation,
jf we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we "find it only as we reach
a basal intelligence. If we seek to bind the many together in an all
embracing system, it is impossible only in and through in Le x. licence .
Xf we seek for unity in Being itself we find it only in intelligence.
If we seek for causality and identity in being we find them only in
intelligence . Xf we would give an account o _ the intelligible crTex
irnose - like products of the world, again intelligence is the
only key. If, finally, we ask for the formal conditions of reality
ve find them in intelligence. The atzempt to define reality itseli
fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitutive concision.
T^e mind can save its own categories from disappearing , c&n realize
its own aims and tendencies, can truly comprehend or even mean any-
thing, only as it relates everything to iree intelligence as ke
source and administrator of the sytem. Againsz this theistic view
there is nroverly no competing view whatever. There seem to be such
views, indeed, but they are really only forms of words, sonorous and

18
swelling often, but without rational substance. To see tl is we
need only consider the atheistic attempt to refer the world, its
order end products, to mechanical necessity. We pass over the
deeper logical difficulties involved in this notion of impersonal
reality and mechanical causation. We also pass over the epistemo-
logical dif ficultict involved in the problem of error on such a
scheme. l.’e say nothing of the puzzle concerning the relation of
the human personality to its mechanical ground. We simply point
out the emptiness of the doctrine itself when considered as an ac-
count of things." This is the brief outline of what Bowne has
wrought out and expanded in numerous works . But even in this brief
form is evident the sufficiency and superiority of his system as com-
pared with Bergson’s system, grounded on a centre or continuity of
shooting out, a flowing, rushing, pushing, coming in contact with an
unknown and unkn>/able interrupter which has turned it upon itself
and against itself and these two conflicting, struggling currents,
without, plan or purpose, producing human personalities and all things
else. Bergson's system raises more questions than it answers, creates
more problems than it solves. To call this current Clod, free, active,
creating, does not in the least make it such or remove the feeling
that we have here a radical mechanism, consequently a system of ne-
^ _—.
cessity. The only free, producing cause we know is personality or
active intelligence. But this is not the character of these currents
as Bergson conceives them. Nor can the fine rhetoric and the splen-
did images in Bergson’s works make his system otherwise than mechani-
cal. There are beautiful descriptions and word pictures but these
are not explanations. They cannot determine the outcome of his sys-
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tern. This is determined by his conception of the fundamental
cause of all things, the nature of his fundamental reality. And
as this is given us throughout his works but especially as his whole
system is summed up in the third chapter of Creative Evolution, we
certainly find that his is after all a mechanical system, dominated
by stern necessity. A center or continuity of shooting out or
flowing is not a person. This is surely what Bowne would reduce
Bergson's system to, for in its present form it cannot be otherwise
with its pushing forces- in real time. Bergson's is a "strung-along
universe". The continuity or interpenetration which he finds among
the states of consciousness, so that, as the notes of a melody or
the ticks of a clock, they melt into one another and are inseparable,
he holds to obtain throughout the universe. This continuity runs
through all reality. The division of reality into systems and
things is an artificial matter of the intellect for practical pur-
poses. These do not exist, all is flow without ceasing. The vital
current is continuous in and through all. All is flow, indivisible,
inseparable, irreversible. "Strung along" is a fine putting of it.
It is James' "stream" idea. Thus it pushes along without purpose,
changing, becoming, evolving, creating, the ascending current toward
spirit, the descending one toward matter and space. Cont inuity gives
unity to this system. Continuity in and among the many holds them
together. As continuity binds the states of consciousness together,
so continuity binds the universe together. Continuity makes possible
the unity and interaction of the many. Eut what is continuity? It
is a pure abstraction. It is not continuity or permeation or inter-
penetration, but the unitary, abiding personal self that binds the
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states of consciousness together. Without active intelligence all
goes to pieces. Continuity cannot save the system from breaking up
into the infinite many. It becomes more and pluralistic, and the
abstraction, continuity
,
cannot give it unity nor solve the problem
of the interaction of the many. Only a unitary, abiding, personal
world-ground is sufficient for this, but Bergson’s world-ground is
not personal. All is becoming. What it may become is unknowable.
i w
Dr, Bowne believes in evolution and continuity but not is a
strung along universe in Bergson’s sense. His is a monistic uni-
verse. The continuity is in the unitary personal ground of all.
This unitary personal cause may and does produce, create things, in
relation to one another according to the plan of the whole, as the
composer of a melody posits the separate notes in harmonious, con-
tinuous relation according to a plan of the whole. The composer's
mind and not the separate notes of the melody is the continuity, the
col tinuous ground. His mind is the ground of production, harmony,
flow and interpenetration. His mind and that alone is the unity that
posits multiplicity in harmony. His plan of the whole is his liberty
not his necessity. According to this he composes and creates.
This plan like the separate notes of the melody is his creation and is
subject to his will and change and modification. It is all his and he
freely uses it. It serves his purpose. It is all in and of and by hi
active intelligence. This has meaning only in and for intelligence,
apart from intelligence it may all seem like a music box wound up and
driven by a mighty, pushing spring grinding this all out, or the move-
ment of the melody pushing itself along in interpenetrating notes, cre-
ating itself. But intelligence persists in getting in somewhere, if
not in the composition then in the hearing of it, etc.
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This comparison represents Bowne’s idea of the relation of the
personal world ground to the universe. It is freely positing, cre-
ating all according to the plan of the whole which is also his cre-
ation and subject to his will and according to which he freely works
creating in harmonious and intelligible relation. The whole depends
upon him constantly. The interaction of the many is possible through
the immanent action of the One which is their ground. It is a con-
tinuous creation, energized and vitalized unceasingly by this personal
cause. New departures are possible and constantly made according to
the will of the composer or creator, but these are not capricious, for
caprice is not freedom, but they are orderly and harmonious. Other-
wise they would be meaningless. Bergson is so anxious to keep the
way open for novelties that anything is possible. Unforeseeability
does not imply absence of plan except on the impersonal plane. Fore-
seeability on the personal plane does not imply rigid necessity.
This is a facm of personal experience and can be understood only on
the personal plane, in terms of active intelligence.
The question will be raised of the relation of human person-
alities to the personal world ground. As persons we have self-
consciousness and self-direction, freedom. This is a fact of ex-
perience which cannot be denied without fatal results to thought and
morality. We have spontaneity. We can originate plan, determine
ourselves. We are personal or v^e must call all illusion, a vast de-
lusion. Yet with all this we are conscious of dependence „ fixity,
uniformity. There is what we call the law of our being, our nature.
There is in us and around us a world of reality which we find and do
not make, which does not depend upon us. We 90 on discover that
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while we live and move and have our own being we do this in a
ground that is in us and also beyond us. Our experience is our
own, yet we are forced to transcend this experience, transcend our-
selves, for the explanation and ground of it all. We are both
phenomenal reality and ontological or causal reality. There is in
our personality an element of fixity as well as an element of free-
dom. Our freedom is saved from caprice and made most safe and museful
because of this element of fixity, because of this law of our being or
nature. We do not find such necessity in this condition that there
is no spontaneity, self-determination, choice, plan or purpose left to
us. We find the only freedom that is worth while in this arrangement.
W'e even go farther and find our larger liberty in positing plans for
ourselves and working according to them. We no more than God are
cramped and determined and necessitated by plan and purpose. Law
and liberty are not incompatible in either morals or thought. And
as we saw, as much as Bergson talks of freedom and seeks to keep the
way open for freedom, his cosmic elan is limited, finite and necessi-
tated. Something interrupts it and turns it back upon itself and a-
gainst itself. In this descending current of matter it finds a lim-
iting power with which it struggles in an effort to revivify and
spiritualize it, to introduce into it as much of indetermination as
possible. In this it is but partially successful. The black rockets
and condensed steam finally fall back in spite of all the efforts of
the burning, r^s-ng rockets and live steam. So the descending current
of matter continues to descend and ovpose in spite of all the efforts
of the ascending current. This vital impetus could not be thus inter-
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rupted and limited were it infinite. No infinite cause or force
can be thus limited and necessitated by any finite force. Berg-
son’s God is finite, a primus inter pares at best, not of its own
free will and choice but by external necessity, hence his is a
system of necessity. Bowne’s world ground is infinite, absolute
in that it is self-sufficient, all sufficient, self-determining,
self-limiting, and only source and cause of all. It is the One
upon which the many depend and through which, as their immanent
as well as transcendent ground, the many interact. His world-
ground is not all and only, as is Hegel’s Absolute, nor is it merely
primus inter pares as the pluralistic God. It freely posits and
sustains all, and, because it is free, it is able and has granted
freedom unto human personalities. Nothing less than infinite
personality as the free world ground can do this. Any other
world ground implies necessity and mechanism.
,.
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II • Theory of Knowledge
Bergson’s theory of knowledge is closely related to his theory
of reality. As we have seen, the cosmic elan, changing, pushing, be-
coming, evolving, creating, ascending, is interrupted and turned a-
gainst itself, so that we have two currents, the ascending one or
spirit and the descending one or matter, so that knowledge demands
the ability to know both matter and spirit of life. The vita.l im-
pulse has produced three distinct ways of knowing, viz. instinct,
intellect and intuition. These three, though related by the con-
tinuity of the vital impulse which produces them so that there is
some of each in the others, .yet are separate, but still are comple-
mentary, Their relation is not, as some psychologists hold, first
instinct leading to intellect, and thence to intuition. But Bergson
holds that the three are separate and distinct productions. The re-
lation between instinct and intuition is closer than that between in-
stinct and intellect or between intellect and intuition. Instinct we
see in its highest form in the lower animals, especially in bees and
ants. It uses skillfully the tools and means furnished by nature.
It does not invent. It does not seek. It is within life and knows
it from within, sympathetically, as life. There is a certain element
of intellect manifest in instinct at times. Intellect characterizes
man as a maker and user of artificial tools, man as a maker and user of
machines. Homo faber is the characterization of man as intellectual.
It is of man as scientist and machinist. Man as intellectual is
dominated by matter, he deals with the material, he is a materialist.
He thinks matter. This is the nature and province of intellect.
It knows life from outside, knows reality as static, inert. Intuition
characterizes life in its highest, spiritual form. Like instinct, but
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richer and fuller, it knows life from within, sympathetically
.
It knows life as living, moving, growing, evolving.
Intellect, he tells us, has been produced to deal with mat-
ter, to know matter. It can know life only indirectly and very
imperfectly, for it is but a part of life, it is but the instrument
of life; so how can it know life? That would be for the part to
know the whole, for the chip cast up by the sea to know the sea. It
would mean for intellect to transcend itself. For life is infinitely
greater and richer than intellect and continually breaks the moulds of
intellect and pours over them.
The function of intellect is to know matter, the inert. This
is the territory or province of science. How does intellect deal
with matter? Kant concluded that there are three and only three al-
ternatives among which to choose a theory of knowledge; either the
mind is determined by things or things are determined by mind or be-
tween mind and things we must suppose a mysterious agreement. But
the truth is, there is a fourth which does not seem to have occurred
to Kant - in the first place, because he did not think that the mind
overflowed the intellect, and in the second place (and this is at bot-
tom the same thing) because he did not attribute to duration an absolute
existence, having put time, a priori, on the same plane as space. This
alternative consists, first of all, in regarding the intellect as a spe-
cial function of the mind, essentially turned toward inert matter; then
in saying that neither does matter determine the form of the intellect
nor does the intellect impose its form on matter, nor have matter and
intellect been regulated in regard to one another by we know not what
pre-established harmony, but that inrellect and matter have progress-
ively adapted themselves to one another in order to at tain at last a
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common form. This adaptation has been brought about quite natu-
rally because it is the same inversion of the same movement which
creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of
things''. (C. E. 205-206).
Although we are told that it is not, this after all seems
very like the pre-established harmony between intellect and matter
which he condemns in K&nt. And although finality is not to be ad-
mitted, the production of intellect to deal with matter and adapted
to matter seems very much like purpose. Intellect thinks matter.
It is adapted to this very thing. It finds geometry in matter be-
cause matter somehow finds geometry in intellect. Intellect is re-
flective
, that is, back looking. It sees the done, not the doing;
the evolved not the evolving; the already made, not the making; the
inert, not the living. Hence, it reduces the moving to the static,
the acting to the inert. It cuts up the current of matter into dis-
tinct things, by spreading under it the net of space, the meshes of
which are larger or smaller, according to its convenience for the pur-
pose of action. Matter is movement, flowing. Separate distinct thing
do not exist. They are the artificial productions of intellect for
practical purposes. Hence, according to Bergson, separate distinct
things are illusions. Intellect proceeds by analysis. It can deal
with the unknown only in terms of the known. Hence, its knowledge is
superficial, external. It can only take superficial, outside views
of this current, matter, which it has made into things static and inert.
This is the best that intellect can do and it is all that science and
evervday affairs demand for practical purposes. In fact, it is all
l
the better suited to practical purposes by this very method or nature.
Intellect merely takes snapshots of moving reality. The reality as

2?
moving, living, becoming, creating, it cannot know. When intel-
lect has taken its view or snapshot, reality has moved on and left it.
Here is the source of the problems of Zeno and the Eleatics, for intel-
lect reduces all to the static. It cannot know things in motion.
Motion is indivisible, but intellect divides it and thus destroys it as
motion. Intellect and science are shut up to the mechanical, the al-
ready made, the all given. By putting together its views and snapshots
and things in infinite number, it can never produce or know living, mov-
ing, becoming reality. Thus, Bergson, limits and depreciates intellect
Like Bovme he realizes the limits of science and mathematics in dealing
with the living and the problems of life. The function of science is
to discover the co-existence and sequence of things and their concomi-
tant variations. This is the province or territory of science and
this is all that is demanded of it. This it can do unmolested and un-
afraid whatever our theory of reality. Evidence is abundant of the
failure science makes when it attempts to go beyond this territory into
that of philosophy or metaphysics and interpret experience and deal with
life. Bergson, seeing this limitation of science and having identified
intellect so completely with science, feels that intellect is limited to
the province of science and if we are to know life, moving, changing,
becoming, it must be by another faculty distinct from intellect, rather
than by a different application or use of the intellect as Bovne holds.
Bence, Bergson conceives another faculty, viz. intuition, by which we
shall be able to know life in the very process of being and creating.
This intellect, Bergson holds, cannot do. If it deals with life, the
moving becoming, it does so by reducing it to the static, inert. It
takes views or snapshots of it. These views are of matter not as
flowing but inert, not of duration or time but of space. Hence Intel-
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iectually we cannot know life, life for the intellect is the unknown
and unknowable. By intellect we are landed in scepticism. Back of
the phenomena with which intellect deals are the noumena which intel-
lect cannot know. If we are to know this noumenonit must be by some
other faculty than intellect, and in some other way than by science.
This noumenon or vital impulse as duration is the province of meta-
physics. The bridge between has been down sice Kant., according to
Bergson. This bridge he hopes to rebuild between science and meta-
physics, between matter and life, between intellect and spirit. This
he proposes to do by intuition.
Intuition is intellectual sympathy. Intuitive knowledge is the
knowledge we have by living experience. It is knowledge from the in-
side not from the outside. By an act of intellect and will, summon-
ing all our power, twisting the self upon itself from its backward,
intellectual, reflective look, we plunge into the flowing stream of
the life current, we are merged in it, carried along with it, become
of it. It is not thinking but living. We are present with it and
in it. We feel, experience, and participate in its duration, its
changing, its movement, its creation, its evolution. This experience
is rare and brief. In it we are free. We are caught away from the
spatial, the material, the superficial, and are bathed in living, mov-
ing, becoming reality. Though rare and brief it is by these intuitive
experiences that the philosopher, whether he be poet, or prophet, or
sculptor, or musician, or metaphysician, sees, feels, knows, experi-
ences life, free, active, creative. He becomes a seer. This know-
ledge he can import to others only by the intellectual concepts which
he is able to formulate of that living experience, or that experience
of living. He has seen and heard and felt that which is unutterable;
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it is the ineffable. These concepts by which he seeks to express
that experience as best he can are but intellectual symbols of that
living experience. But these are seized by intellect and become the
coin of its realm and are soon mistaken for the life itself. So
that intellect of itself never gets beyond these concepts or symbols
which are its whole stock and trade. But for intuition and these
intuitive experiences there would be no concepts and but for con-
cepts intellect would be bankrupt.
In "Matter and Memory" Bergson shows how intuition by perception
bridges the chasm between mind and matter, between soul and body.
Pure perception takes place in the object not, in us. By means of pure
perception, which is perception without duration or memory, we get so
close to matter that we actually slip over into it just as by intuition
we get into the life current. So that we experience flowing matter
from the inside as flowing. As wTe became one with the living current,
merged in it, wre become one with flowing matter, merged in it. We must
become matter. This is what Bergson’s theory of pure perception cer-
tainly comes to. As much as he combats materialism and epiphenomenal-
ism and pyschophysics
,
he here, by his theory of perception, cer-
tainly delivers himself into the hands of materialism. Spirit has
gone over into the camp of matter, to spy it out, to learn what it is.
This is possible; for they are not such enemies as we may suppose.
They are nearer one another than we sometimes think. In fact they
differ in degree rather than in kind. Bergson hopes to recover
spirit safe from the camp of matter and some how bring matter back
with it and thus close up the breach and overcome this unmanageable
dualism which is in his system. This he does in a very unique way.
To get spirix, by means of pure perception, over into the realm of
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matter, he emphasized, its close kinship to matter. He talks about
perception being in the object and not in us, and about sensations
being spatial or having extension, all of which is unmeaning accord-
ing to Bowne. But once over there he begins to tell us there is
no such a thing as pure perception but that all perception is con-
crete, that in all perception there is duration and memory which is
spirit, so after all it was not spirit yielding itself to matter, as
matter thought, but matter being overcome by spirit. Thus he has
come to know matter and space by intuition and has returned safe to
the camp of spirit, bringing matter, fettered and bound, with him.
Ipse dixit and it is done. But is it, except verbally? One in-
stant he is in imminent danger of pure materialism and the next, of
pure idealism. He cannot reduce matter to spirit, or spirit to mat-
ter. He cannot identify the two, so that mind and matter, 30ul and
body are one and the same. Their interaction demands a deeper cause.
He is but shuffling words. He is simply vibrating between the two.
He cannot in this easy way bridge the chasm which, his system has cre-
ated. When he allowed that unknown and ’unknowable interrupter to
knock his system into a pluralism he at once took upon himself a pro-
blem that is found in all his system and which, he cannot solve or get
out
.
Intuition is the process of knowing by plunging into the life
current, becoming merged in it. It requires intellect, will and an
heroic effort to make the plunge, but, once in, we yield ourselves to
the current. Thus we become free, thus we experience duration and
truly live. But is not this self annihilation? We are free in the
sense that we are silenced, blotted out. Individuality is destroyed.
All that is left is a certain undifferentiated feeling.
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There is no longer a "me" and "not me". It is a false
mysticism in which will, thought, effort, self-consciousness
,
per-
sonality are swallowed up, blotted up. This is Nirvana. It is
the Hegelian absolute idealism. There is here nothing of that
earnest, persistent, strenuous effort which characterizes the thought,
the freedom, the morality of Kant and Bowne. The self of Bergson
achieves its richest and fullest reality when it annihilates itself
rather than when it most self-consciously, voluntarily and courageously
asserts itself. It achieves its freedom by losing itself not by find-
ing itself. There is a true mysticism in which by faithful, voluntary,
self-conscious effort we come into personal contact with reality, but
we do not plunge into it by plunging out of ourselves. Bergson is a
mystic in spite of his protests to the contrary, and his turns out to
be that false mysticism which means self annihilation, the yielding
ourselves to and being overcome by reality or God. Going in the direc-
tion of the intuition or perception of matter, materialism annihilates
the self; going in the direction of intuition of spirit the self is
annihilated by spirit or the cosmic elan. In both cases knowledge
also is destroyed.
Bowne' s theory of knowledge is also closely related to bis
theory of reality. In brief it is this: Knowledge is possible
because all is grounded in intelligence; all has been posited accord-
ing to the laws of mind; what active intelligence has done active intell
igence can reproduce as knowledge, active intelligence can know active
intelligence. It is in terms of active intelligence, personality,
j
that we must think of the universe of things and the universe of persona
and the universe of knowledge, which is all the universe of active
intelligence
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Empiricism or sensationalism makes the mind purely passive in
knowing. Impressions are made on it from without. Knowledge then
is the mere reading off what the mind passively receives. There is
no unitary abiding self that gathers up the successive impressions,
gives them a meaning and sets them in a rational order. Bowne shows
that there can be no knowledge unless there is an active, unitary,
abiding self or subject which transforms these fleeting impressions
into sensations and rational knowledge. Otherwise all become merely
a flux, a fleeting phantasmagoria, leaving no meaning. As Green has
done so Bowne shows that apart from an active, abiding, unitary self,
fleeting impressions never become sensations or rational knowledge.
Bergson’s self lacks this permanence, lacks this unitary, abiding, ac-
tive nature. It is continuous, successive states of consciousness,
interpenetrating, as the notes of a melody, and running off in duration.
It mechanically rolls upon itself and accumulates in time as a. snowball
on the snow. He rejects what he calls a "formless ego, indifferent and
unchangeable, on which are threaded the psychic states which are set up
as independent entities" (C. E. 3). This is his opinion of such an a-
biding ego and its relation to its states. Eowne’s idea is that it is
the permanent active ego, not as a thread on which to string already
formed states, but as an abiding active person to make these states
possible, to make them states at all, give them rational meaning and
formulate them into knowledge. Otherwise all is flooded away and there
is even no way to know that such flooding is taking place, far less to
express it.
Apriorism, on the other hand, holds that the mind may know many
things independently of experience. According to Bowne knowledge or
experience is not something given ready made from without nor is it
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something that the mind independently produces within itself without
reference to reality. True, knowledge is actively constituted by the
mind within but not independently of the external universe. Objective
reference is implicit in thought. There is a world of reality which we
do not make but find. Knowledge or experience is possible only through
a certain constitutive mental activity according to principles immanent
in the understanding. In this way the raw material of sense impres-
sions which are fleeting and discontinuous is built into a rational
world of experience. Bowne sums up this theory of knowledge or ex-
perience thus: “The world of experience exists for us only through a
rational spiritual principle by which we reproduce it for our thought,
and it has its existence apart from us only through a rational, spirit-
ual principle on which it depends, and the rational nature of which it
expresses”. (Personalism, 110). All things exist only in and for
intelligence (ibid 111). . The personality or spiritual principle,
which is the ground of the world of persons and the world of things,
posits, all according to the principles of intelligence. As we have
seen the world of matter, force, motion, space and time is phenomenal,
i.e. it exists not of itself, the ground of its being is not in itself,
it is real in the sense that it is no illusion or delusion, no fiction
of imagination, but it is not real in the sense of self existence, ac-
tive, it exists only in and through and for intelligence. The ontolog-
4
ical, the ground, the causal reality is intelligence. So that the
principles of being and the principles of thought are identical.
These immanent principles are called categories. These categories have
no meaning apart from intelligence and experience. They simply
express the way active intelligence works in dealing with the raw
material brought to it through sense impressions or immediate
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experience of objective reality, for such interaction between the
mind and objective reality is possible through the intelligent action
of the immanent One
,
or spiritual principle in which the many are
grounded. Thus the mind acting according to its immanent principles
truly reproduces for us the world of reality which we do not make but
discover. Knowledge is not purely subjective, relative, nor is it
passed into the mind ready made. ihis matter of the categories has
been much misunderstood and Bowne has expressed it so truly and well
x,hat I must quote at length his own words: "The categories in them-
selves are simply forms of mental arrangement and merely prescribe
the form in which experience is to be ordered. In this respect they
are like the rules of grammar which prescribe how w^e shall speak if we
speak at all, but which in themselves have no concrete contents,
living speecli
,
then, is not merely grammar, but definite meaning ex-
pressed according to grammatical rules, and when there is no specific
meaning the grammar itself moves in a vacuum. All experience, ac-
cording to Kant, is real only through some given fact, and apart from
such fact is empty. Thus we might talk of sensations of a class we
have never experienced, as the sensations of a tenth sense; but it is
plain that such talk, however learned it might be, would be formal and
empty, as there would be no concrete sen^tionto give significance or
substance to our wrords. In the case of real sensation, on the contrary
there is actual experience wdiich gives content to our reflection. Un-
til the actual experience is given there is no security that there is
anything whatever corresponding to our formal phases: but when experi-
ence is given we have no longer simple logical concepts, but we have
something lived and realized. Kow Kant said that the categories
-.
.
.
-
.
...
-
.
.
,
’
,
.
.
-
:
.
35
are applied only to such sense experience and otherwise are empty.
Here he made the mistake of limiting experience to the physical
sensations and did not extend his doctrine to the data of self-
consciousness. When this limitation is removed it then becomes
strictly true Lhat the categories have simply the function of form-
ing and expressing some matter which is directly experienced or which
can be assimilated to experience, and apart from that relation they
are formal and empty. They must always be brought into contact with
experience in some way, in order to acquire reality, or to make sure
they represent any possible object for thought. Thus if we talk of
the categories of being, unity, identity, causality, substance, etc.,
in abstraction from any given experience, they are utterly vacuous, so
that we cannot tell whether there be any corresponding fact or not;
and it is only as we find these categories realized in living ex-
perience that they require other than formal meaning, or pass for any-
thing more than purely verbal counters. They are like grammar when
there is no speech, or rules for saying something when there is nothing
to be said". (Personalism 1C0-2). Thus we see that the categories
apart from experience are empty and experience apart from the cate-
gories is an unintelligible phantasmagoria or flux. Categories, like
everything else, must be understood in terms of intelligence. Intel-
ligence explains them, not vice versa. Kant, by giving the categories
only subjective validity, made knowledge purely relative, subjective,
and had on his hands the unknown thing-rin-itself which the mind could
not get at. The mind can know only the phenomenal, but there is a
noumenal which the mind cannot know. The relation between the phen-
omenal and noumenal Kant never succeeded in defining. Hence the
Kantian agnosticism and Spencer’s unknowable and transfigured realism.
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But Bowne shows that if Kant had been consistent, or thought his
problem through, he would have found his noumenon vanishing as a
fiction of imagination. What we really have is phenomena and
their causes, and these causes turn out to be intelligence.
Phenomenal reality and its cause are all that there are, and phen-
omenal reality has no meaning except in and for intelligence. Hence
for us, as intelligent, phenomenal reality is intelligible; and as
intelligence we know intelligence
,
the ontological, substantial,
causal reality. When Bowne uses the term noumenal reality or nou-
menon he means active intelligence. The noumenon or noumenal reality
is the ground or cause of phenomenal reality, and phenomenal reality
manifests its noumenal cause. Thus we may know the noumenal real-
ity through the phenomenal reality. But even more intimately than
this may we as persons know the Personal Cause of the world of things
and the world of persons. As person knows person we may know Him.
Bergson rejects mechanism in every form because it conflicts
with duration. Bowne rejects it because it cannot explain an intel-
ligible world. The intelligibility of the world and intelligence in
us can be explained by nothing less than intelligence or personality
as the cause. To talk of something supra-personal is to indulge in
words and produce something to which we can give no rational or intel-
ligible meaning. Both the known and the knovc-er demand active intelli-
gence, personality, as their sufficient reason. Bowne finds intel-
lect and intelligence sufficient. He does not, like Bergson, depreciat
intelligence and demand another and higher faculty of knowledge to
know living reality. The purpose or use of the intellect in science
is to discover the relations of coexistence ana sequence among things,
to ascertain their laws of concomitant variation. This is the pro-
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vince of science and this is the work of intellect when it works
in this province. But because science is limited to this province,
it is a mistake to think intellect or active intelligence is also
limited to this province. Intellect is not limited to science.
The vrhole field of reality is open to intellect or active intelli-
gence. Intellect belongs also to the province of philosophy, which
province is the interpretation and causal explanation of phenomena.
Here the function of intellect is to interpret and to know life as
active, living, producing intelligence. Intellect knows living,
active, intelligence, personality, not only by its manifestation
in phenomena but also directly, immediately. This living, active
person is unitary and abiding, even through all change and becoming.
" It has a self equality throughout experience: any other conception
destroys itself'. (Personalism, 103) On the impersonal plane
if we admit change all becomes flux# nothing abides, but that cannot
be admitted without destruction to self and knowledge. Or if we
admit identity all becomes a rigid stare which also makes knowledge
and self impossible. This antinomy is soluble only on the personal
plane where we can have, as we must have, both change and identity,
both becoming and permanence. If the moving, growing, becoming is
to be known as such, it can be only by a unitary abiding person or
self in which we have both change and identity. "In thought itself
there must be no flow. The contents of ideas must remain constant
quantities. If there be change in reality the mind must stiffen
even the change into fixity. The thought of change must be as change-
less as the thought of the unchanging". (Theory of Thought pg. 38)
The mind knows the changing only by the fact that while the mind is
unitary and abiding it is also growing and becoming, not as a rolling
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snowball, which is mechanical, but in that vital way as only living
intelligence can grow and become, and which living intelligence alone
can know, and know only by experience, but which it cannot explain, for
this fundamental. Intelligence, living, active, explains all else
and cannot be explained or explain itself, for that would mean to
transcend itself, which is impossible except in imagination. Any-
thing else destroys the self and hence knowledge also.
Bergson's theory, by depreciating intellect and creating another
faculty, viz., intuition, produces a dualism, a double self, which he
never is able to overcome. Bowne, on the other hand, with his theory
of phenomenal and ontological reality, and his partition of territory
between philosophy and science, all grounded in active intelligence
saves himself from that pluralism, and scepticism, and flux of all
things, which makes Bergson's system insufficient and unmanageable,
and destroys both self and knowledge. The problem of error thus be-
comes unsolvable. Bowne finds living intelligence acting according
to the immanent principles of its nature, the categories, sufficient
for the purpose of knowledge. The intellect, the active intelligence,
is not limited by these categories any more than a railway train is
limited by its track. It is the track that gives the train the only
freedom that is safe and worth while. Bergson, by his extreme limita-
tion and depreciation of intellect and the bringing in of another fac-
ulty in the interest of knowledge and freedom, destroys self and know-
ledge. A bare intellectualism which recognizes only part of the self
Bowne rejecas. Such a separation or division of the unitary, abiding,
self is, in fact, impossible. To attempt it except for convenience in
thought is to do violence to the self or person. Man is a unit and he
is more than bare, meager intellect. It is a misconception of intel-
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lect to think of it in such exclusiveness. Feeling and will are also
always present. Active intelligence includes the whole self. This
is our means of knowing. A superficial, hare intellectualism Bowne
as much as Bergson holds insufficient, hut he does not set aside intel-
lect and bring in another faculty to get beyond this condition. Ac-
tive intelligence is sufficient.
Bov,Tie recognizes degrees of knowledge by the intellect. It may
know superficially and perhaps does most of the time and this may satis-
fy the practical demands of common sense even the better. Common
sense gets along very well with the visible heavens and knows and cares
very little for the astronomical heavens. But this does not limit or
hinder intelligence from the deeper and richer insight into life which
may be attained, not by the annihilation of self, but hy the more
earnest, careful and persistent use of intelligence in which the rights
and needs of the whole person are recognized. Bowne recognizes that
the rigor and vigor method of using the intellect in which it is de-
manded that everything be demonstrated, is very superficial, for the
richest and deepest things of life can never be demonstrated. Logic
truly understood does not demand such rigor and vigor. The purpose
of logic is to clarify by weighing, comparing, reconsidering. The
mind thus proceeding freely can deal with error. But in it all the
needs of the whole person are taken into consideration. It recog-
nizes that "man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator, he
is also a living being with practical interests and necessities to
which he must adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been
one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been
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considered solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas he is a
great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration and
these are far more powerful factors than the logical intellect.
Hence in its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of
practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions
or speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with the uni-
verse. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at
bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities.
And these are reached as articulate principles, not by speculative con-
struction, but by analysis of practical life. Life is richer and
deeper than speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by
which we live. The law the logician of rigor and vigor lays down is
this: Nothing may be believed which is not proved. The law which the
mind actually follows is this: Whatever the mind demands for the sat-
isfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as
real in default of positive disproof”.
'
(Theism p. 18). Bowne thus
brings to the problem of knowledge, as to all the other problems of
life, the whole personality with all its needs. Fart of our nature
or personality is not cut off and limited as mere intellect for intel-
lectual! 9m and then depreciated because it is insufficient, and then
another faculty brought in to help us find the way out and complete
our knowledge. Bergson succeeds by dividing the self so that he has
two selves. The self of the intellect becomes material and spatial.
Materialism here destroys the self. The other self attains its know-
ledge by a plunge into living, moving reality and thus commits suicide,
annihilates itself. Bowne holds to the unitary, active, abiding self
which finds its demands satisfied in a world grounded in active intel-
ligence. As personal, it knows not only indirectly through phenomena
i:
"
,
.
.
,
<
*
:
,
-
I
.
.
.
.
,
.
*
.
41
but also by sympathy and immediately, though imperfectly, the per-
sonal, spiritual World Ground. The One and the Many here meet in
the same universe and both are 3aved. bourne’s theory here passes over
into his religion where man the son of God may know God his Father by a
deep spiritual experience, by communion of life as person with person,
as friend with friend. This is possible and intelligible only in
terms of the whole personality. God, the Father, does not, like
Chronos, swallow his children, but in this filial relation with God
man finds life and in life finds knowledge. Here no doubt i9 mystery
but it is because we are again face to face with the fundamental facts
of life. Here no doubt is mysticism but it is not that false, mysti-
cism of Bergson in which the self is silenced, loses its individuality,
but that true mysticism of the deepest and most intimate relations of
life, of person with person, the mysticism in which the self finds its
fullest and richest individuality, in which we know even as we are
known, in which we see face to face. We see light in His light.
Spirit holds communion with spirit.
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I I I . Change and Identity
Bergson's system is called the philosophy of change. He is
styled the modern Heraclitus. For h.m everything changes without
ceasing. All is change except the unchanging law of change. Fure
duration is defined as a succession of qualitative changes, which
mingle and interpenetrate, which have no precise boundaries, no
tendency to separate from one another. The vital impulse is a
ceaseless flowing, changing, becoming, evolving, creating. All is
flux. The seeming fixity and permanence is due to the spatializing
tendency of the intellect. It results from considering reality
under the aspect of space rather than time or duration which is the
true, essential nature of reality. The rigid, the inert, the static
are only the result of the practical intellect dealing with matter,
which is the descending current. Bowne, like Bergson, recognizes
ana emphasizes this 'universal fact of change, nor can we, as Bowne
says, conceive of it as merely a matter of qualities and hold that
the thing has a core of pure being which is changeless. This core
of pure being is a fiction and change goes to the very heart of real-
ity. Change among things means change in things. What seems the
most rigid is found to be changing. The scientist gives up his atom
as solid particles and replaces them by vortex rings or electrons,
centres of energy and motion. Change in all around, we see. Yea,
and find it even in ourselves. Change is a necessary and important
principle of life. Thus do we have growth, development, progress.
Otherwise all would become stale, barren, dead. Growth, development
and progress mean change.
But we have also the idea and the experience of identity or
permanence, and we feel sure that permanence somewhere as well as
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change is necessary. Thought demands permanence somewhere, it must
reach it or perish. If all is change we could never have the idea
or experience of permanence, for all would be flooded away. So
while the Heraclities defined the basal principle as becoming, which
they regarded as a continuous process, the Eleatics defined the basal
principle as being
,
which they viewed as unitary and changeless
existence. The truth is in both of these. There is change and there
is identity or permanence, and both must be provided for in our system.
Eergson puts supreme emphasis on the fact of change and makes
no sufficient provision in his system for permanence. What of per-
manence we may seemingly have through intellect turns out to be artifi-
cial and superficial, in fact, illusory, as we have seen. But if
there is to be permanence, it like change must go to the very heart of
being. A superficial, artificial identity is not sufficient. The
mind can deal no more with complete homogeneity or all change and un-
likeness. In complete heterogeneity we have groundless becoming.
Eergson is so anxious to provide for new beginnings, new departures,
which are necessary to account for the facte of life which we recognize
are not a monotonous repetition of the past, that he opens wide the door
for change and novelty. So wide in fact is the ample provision he
would make for the new in freedom from the old that not even God him-
self can tell what is going to happen, indeed anything may happen and
miracles may become a commonplace everyday experience. In his efforts
to avoid mechanism, in which the only thing that happens is that the
implicit becomes explicit, he verges on positivism, in which the new
is so different from the old that vie cannot look for the cause of the
new in the old. According to his principle of duration the new and
the old are strung along somehow together, the present trailing the
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past with it, so that he has what has been called "a strung-along
universe”, which is proceeding without plan or purpose, for to intro-
duce purpose or finalism is but a backward look of the intellect at
the already made. The intellect thereby spatializes duration and
limits the present by the past or by the future. The way must be
kept open for ceaseless change, but this becomes caprice.
Knowledge demands a fixed fulcrum to deal with changing reality.
If the knower and the object are changing at the same rate and in the
same manner, they are relatively static. It is as two persons on dif-
ferent trains moving at the same speed in the same direction, so that
relatively they are not moving at all and their knowledge is of the
static and not of the moving and changing. If the two trains are
running at different speeds, we have the problem all over again, "Eow
can we know the changing”? As we have seen, Bergson’s theory of
knowledge, based on change, tends to destroy the self in matter or to
swallow it up in spirit, and thus makes knowledge impossible. The
intellect that reduces all to the static and inert can not give us
knowledge of the changing, yet, the thought of change must have as
fixed a content as the thought of the changeless, cr knowledge is im-
possible. A changing thought or idea continually runs away before
giving us its meaning, and consciousness of change is not possible to
a consciousness that is itself all change or a stream. Yet the fact
of change must be recognized and v.re can know it as change only by that
vdiich is permanent. The facts of experience and knowledge demand
both change and identity for their satisfaction. On the impersonal
plane, if we admit change, all becomes change, complete heterogeneity,
flow. If, on the impersonal plane, we admit identity, all becomes
rigid, fixed, dead. There can be no life or progress. At best
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there would he but monotonous repetition of the past. Change we
must have and identity we must have. Life and knowledge demand
both, but each tends to destroy the other.
There is no way of breaking this deadlock or solving this
puzzle except, as Bowne shows, we rise to the personal plane. It
is personality alone that can deal with this antinomy. Only in per-
sonality can we have some abiding and identical principle superior to
change and constant in change, and here it does not consist in any
rigid core of being but rather in the extraordinary power of self-
consciousness by which the being detaches itself from its states and
constitutes itself their identical and abiding ground. Where this is
lacking there may be continuity of process, but nothing more. The
unchangeability is purely formal as when a given note is constantly
produced and this formal unchangeability is possible only through the
unchanging self. This is possible and intelligible only on the per-
sonal plane. In active intelligence we have that self-equality
throughout the changing experience which gives us the permanence, the
identity, demanded to know the changing as changing. Thought must
reach the changeless or perish. But, on the impersonal plane and
under the law of the sufficient reason, thought can never reach the
changeless but abides in the eternal flow and infinite regress. This
lav; compels us to find the consequent in the antecedent. If change
here, then change there. If plurality here, then plurality there.
The problem can never be solved on the mechanical plane, but only on
the plane of free personality. The changelessness we need is not the
rigidity of a logical category, but the self-identity and self-eauality
of intelligence
. Successive existence is not identity, and changeless
existence cannot be found. Identity is given as the self-equality 0 f
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intelligence throughout experience and any other conception destroys
itself. Both change and changelessness in the concrete have to be
interpreted with reference to self-consciousness. Abstract
definitions and temporal coordinates only distort the problem and
make it fictitious. The change and identity that sufficient rea-
son demands is found in the self as unitary, active, and abiding and
not the self as a rolling, accumulating snowball.
What is true of all agents or persons is true of God or the
World Ground. God as a rigid sameness of existence would contain no
explanation of the advancing, cosmic movement and would admit of no
change in action and knowledge. His changelessness of being consists,
not in ontological rigidity, but rather in the constancy and continuity
of the lav; which rules His purpose. The unchangeability of God means
only the constancy and continuity of the divine nature which exists
through all the divine acts as their law and source. Such a personal
God, rather than a God who is a continuity of shooting out without
plan or purpose, accounts for change and novelty and new beginnings
and development, and remains superior to change and constant in change.
The change and identity, demanded in God, are found in the extraordinary
power of his personality. Any God less than this destroys Himself,
destroys reality.
This problem of change and identity like the other problems we
consider finds its solution only in terms of personality. The active
intelligence is the explanation. In this intelligence cannot be ex-
plained but it explains all. It is fundamental and the categories here
again must be understood in terms of the experience of intelligence.
There is change and there is identity. Either alone destroys life
and thought. All can be saved only by personality.

4?
IV. The Self
According to Bergson the self is pure duration. Pure dura-
tion is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes
when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its
present state from its former states. (T.JT.W. p.100). It is pure
heterogeneity. It is a succession of interpenetrating states of
consciousness, a succession of states of consciousness melting into
one another like the notes of a melody. Within myself a process of
organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going1 on, which
constitutes true duration. Within our ego there is succession with-
out mutual externality; outside the ego there is mutual externality
without succession, conscious life presents itself under a double as-
pect, according as it is perceived directly or by refraction through
space. Our ego comes in contact with the external world at its sur-
face, a.nd our superficial psychical life comes to be pictured as set
out in a homogeneous medium, space, but when we consider the inner- self
which feels, deliberates, decides, we see that its states cannot be
separated in space without undergoing a deep alteration.
But the two selves form one person, and duration therefore seems to be
the same for both. Experience ought to teach us to distinguish be-
tween duration as quality, such as consciousness immediately appre-
hends it, and materialized time which has been made quantitative by
development in space. We should therefore distinguish two forms of
multiplicity, two very different ways of regarding duration, two as-
pects of the conscious life. Below homogenous duration, which is the
extensive symbol of true duration, a close psychological analysis
Lstinguishes a duration whose heterogenous moments permeate one another;
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below the numerical multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative
multiplicity; below the self with well defined states, a self in which
succeeding each other means melting .into one another and forming an
organic whole. (T. F. W. p. 128). But the latter, the fundarnental
self, is often lost sight of in ordinary practical life. Cur exter-
nal social life has more practical importance for us than our inner
and individual existence.
He begins "Creative Evolution" with a striking contrast between
what we mean by our own existence and the existence of inert matter.
"Sensations, feeling, volitions, ideas - such are the changes into
which my existence is divided and vjhich color it in turns. I change
then without ceasing". Each of these sensations, ere. is itself
undergoing change every moment; if it did not, duration would cease
to flow. "My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is
continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates". We
notice the change only at intervals, but "the state itself is nothing
but change"
,
and the transition from one state to another is continu-
ous. Our attention separates these states artificially, and, in order
to reunite them, it has to imagine " a formless ego, indifferent one?
unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states which it has set
up as independent entities". But this colorless and impassive ego
is a mere symbol without any reality; its only use is to remind us that
the discontinuity we have introduced into our psychic states is an
artificial discontinuity of our own making, for what re have done is to
eliminate real time. And time is just the stuff our psychical life is
made of. There is no stuff more resistant nor more substantial than
real time.
From this it will be seen that Bergson’s idea of the self is that
it is a succession of interpenetrating states of consciousness, in
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brief, states of consciousness is the self. Anything like an
abiding ego is ruled out as a mere symbol without reality. As he
conceives it, states of consciousness in succession, in a stream,
are sufficient to explain the self and its experience. How entirely
different this is from Bowne’s position! He holds that the self is
unitary, abiding, active intelligence or ego or person, that has, or
is the ground of, states of consciousness. States of consciousness
are one thing and consciousness of states is a very different thing.
How there can be states of consciousness or consciousness of states
apart from a conscious ego or abiding, active self is to Borne incon-
ceivable. It is the unitary, active, abiding self that produces and
knows states of consciousness, by its inner activity. States that
are states of no person is contrary to all experience. To speak of
states of consciousness or consciousness in general as Bergson does
apart from any abiding active person is for Borne an impossibility,
an unknowable. For him, conscious states imply a conscious self
as their abiding ground. Although Bergson rules out the idea of an
ego, he does just what every other person, who breaks up the self
into states or sensations, does; he brings in the self, or me, in some
other form, as Green has so fully shown in his " Introduction to Hume"
.
Bergson says: "As our attention has artificially distinguished and
separated these states it is by an artificial bond that it is obliged
subsequently to reunite them. Consequent^, it imagines a self or me
f
amorphous and unchanging, on which the psychological states that it
has converted into independent entities may be threaded and moved
like the different pearls of a necklace". "In truth this substratum
is not a reality. It is for our consciousness merely a sign intended
to remind it perpetually of the artificial character by which attention
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sets one state side by side with another where really there is con-
tinuity unfolding itself". Bergson, it will be noted, in this quo-
tation as well as throughout the rest of his system, refers to what
"our attention" and the "me" and the "our" and "myself" do, but yet
the ego or self which is implied and stated in these terms is de-
clared to be a fiction and has no existence. (C. E. 3). Uhat he puts
out at the door returns by the window and he is helpless to prevent it,
for states apart from a "me " are unmanageable and meaningless. Berg-
son has attempted to substitute the "not me" for the "me", which is to
attempt to reverse the order of life and experience. The "not me"
implies the "me" and brings the "me" with it in spite of his refusing
to admit it.
Even granting his idea that interpenetrating, successive, states
of consciousness constitutes the self, then all becomes flow, change.
The self is born and passes away every instant. There is no self
that abides. Kow the past is dragged along in memory, - in fact, how
memory itself is possible, is inexplicable. If this change and memory
are continually going on and we know it, are conscious of it, it is we
who find the change that is continually going on there in our deepest
selves into which he bids us descend. It i3 we who abide and remember.
If I find change continually going on in my deepest self or elsewhere
then I_ must be there all the time. If I were not there I could not
find it, and I find it all the time then !_ must be there all the time,
and the I that finds it there all the time must be xhe same I . Un-
less Lhe same identical I were there, it could not be conscious that
change was continually going on and remember that it bad been doing so.
There could be no consciousness of change ‘unless uhere were some thing
to contrasu with it. And what we contrast with it is precisely our
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own identity. Even the changes that go on within us would not he
changes for us 'unless we had something to measure them hy
f
and it
is precisely by reference to our personal identity that we do mea-
sure them. It is only by reference to something unchanging that
we can be conscious of change. (Jevons, "Personality" 104). As
we have seen in the chapter on "Change and Identity" this whole pro-
blem of change can be solved only on the plane of unitary, active,
abiding personality. Here and here alone can this antinomy be recon-
ciled. Apart from such a self, if we have change everything becomes
flux; or if we have identity everything becomes rigid, fixed, unchange-
able. Bergson tells us that these interpenetrating states are in-
separable. lie emphasizes "their continuity and this continuity is
the thread on which Pie strings them as pearls. But what such contin-
uity is apart from an abiding self is inconceivable. This abstraction,
continuity
,
is his substitute for the abiding ego which Pie ruled out as
a fiction, but which we Piave brought in to bind together these states
which we have artificially separated. But this abstraction, continuity
or permeation is not strong enough to hold these states together and
save the unity of the self. We have succeeded in separating them sc
completely that we have built up another self. We are then two selves,
the deep true self of duration, spirit, and the superficial, false self
of space, matter, and intellect, and it is in the latter that we live
most of the time and in which the practical work and associations of
lifo take place, yet these two selves are somehow one. It is in the
seif of duration that we find our freedom. Here Bergson’s dualism a-
gain manifests itself. These two selves he never is able to reconcile.
Cne is of the ascending current and the other of the descending cur-
rent and these two are in conflict. The ascending current tends
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toward pure spirit and freedom, the descending toward pure space.
Between these limits there are an indefinite number of degrees of
spirit and freedom, and degree is a self. Why not then an indefinite
number of selves instead of only two? Thus in another way we have
reached the same conclusion as above where ail is change and any state
of consciousness might, while it lasted, be the self and thus there
would be an indefinite number of selves which is saying that we are le-
gion and in reality nobody in particular, for there is no abiding self
to know and speak. The self has become a flux, a stream.
Again he refers to the self as a snowball rolling upon the snow,
accumulating and increasing ana changing as it rolls, so that all its
past is rolled up with the present. Thus the self, as continuous state?
of consciousness, progresses, accumulates, changes and all the past
is continually present, so that all that we have ever felt or thought
or been, yea even the prenatal facus of our lives, are continually pre-
sent with us seeking to break into the present, are only restrained by
the cerebral system. The mass of all the conscious states of our
whole life bound together by interpenetration and continuity constitute
our present self and experience. We are masses of conscious states,
superficial, spatial, intellectual states and deep temporal spiritual
states all bound together by continuity
,
as the snowball rolled upon
the snow. There is no more unity about such a self than there i3 a-
bout the snowball. It is but a mechanical unity in which individual-
ity is lost. In fact the only individuality which Bergson knows or
can admit is not in the spiritual nature but in the bodilj^ organism.
Individuality is not for Bergson as for Bowne a spiritual matter.
"On flows the vital current, running through human generations, sub-
dividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indi-

53
cated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter.
Thus souls are continually being created which nevertheless in a cer-
tain sense preexisted. They are nothing else than the little rills
into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through
the body of humanity". (C. E. 269). "We ourselves are a compromise
between the spiritual movement and the material movement. Supra-
consciousness has organized us by insinuating itself into matter, the
object of this organization being to triumph over necessity. Con-
sciousness is mobility itself, but our own consciousness is compelled
to drag a body and to share its vicissitudes. The union gives rise to
individuality, and our feeling of self, or personality, comes from the
fact that our consciousness of the movements of our own body differs
from our consciousness of the movements of other bodies". (Kitchin
236). So that according to Bergson our individuality or self-hood is
determined by our bodies rather than by our spirits. It is a bodily
thing rather than a spiritual as Bowne holds. If it is a matter of
the body when the body perishes personal identity is destroyed.
hot only does the self not have a distinct individuality even in
connection with matter, but by the weight of its past and by the vital
current which throws it off as a little rill, it is pre-determined.
Its freedom is simply in doing the thing that the driving power of its
past and of the current forces it to do. V.re may talk of freedom here
as Bergson does, but how under these conditions there can be any
spontaneity or choice, it is difficult to understand. Bergson admits
as much in what he has to say of the superficial, spatial, intellectual
self in which we live and move and have our being so much of the time,
the practical self. It is a mechanical self. The other self is a
/
-.
»
• .
*
'
•
< ,
•
'
-
.
•
‘
*
*
'
c
.
<
1
, <
*
54-
thing of rare, brief experiences when by what of intellect and will we
have we plunge into the life current and gain our rare, brief freedom
by annhilating ourselves.
Bowne's self, on the other hand, is active intelligence, unitary
and abiding, which the Personal Cause of the world freely posits in His
own image and sustains and vitalizes every instant. It is free because
its personal ground is free. It abides because He abides. It lives and
moves and has its being in Him, but yet it has a spiritual individuality
of its own. It is not a mass of states bound together by a something
called continuity or inter-permeation so that it is strung along, nor the
the unity of a snowball, but its unity is in its deepest, abiding, spirit
ual nature. It may live a superficial, worldly, materialistic life, as
so many times it does, thus limiting itself, or it may live a deep, rich,
spiritual life, but it is one and the same self. And in passing from
the earthy, superficial life to the spiritual life it does not destroy
its individuality, yea even itself, but gains and saves it individuality,
freedom and self. Its identity is its self-equality throughout experi-
ence. It changes and abides. It is the causal ground of its conscious
states. Their unity is not found in themselves but in their unitary
ground. Unity and continuity apart from an abiding self we have not.
This self did not preexist in this personal cause that produced it, cre-
ated it, as the snowball existed in the snow or the rill in the great
stream, so that it is so much being deducted from its cause which is di-
minished so much thereby and which may be considered as never coming to J
consciousness except in these rills and organisms. Bergson verges on
pantheism. Bowne by personalism saves the personality and individuality
of his world ground and provides at the same time for the personality anc
individuality of human beings. Bergson by refusing to come to person-
alism cannot so save either his world ground or finite persons.
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V. Space and Time
1
.
Space
In "Time and Free Will", Bergson holds that, as our senses
perceive the qualities of bodies and space along with them, we have
to decide whether (1) space or extensity is an aspect or quality of
these physical qualities, or whether, (2) these qualities are essen-
tially unextended, space coming in as a later addition, but being it-
self sufficient and coming in without them. The first hypothesis re-
duces space to an abstraction, rather than an extract, the element be-
longing to certain sensations in common. This makes space but a ment-
al form of experience. It has no other reality. It is phenomenal.
This is Bowne's position. In the second case, space would be a reality
as solid as the sensations themselves, though of a different order.
This is what Bergson holds. Space or extensity is not an abstraction,
"Space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simul-
taneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differ-
entiation other than that of qualitative differentiation and consequent-
ly it is a reality with no quality". (T. F. ¥. 95) He draws a dis-
tinction between perception of extensity and the conception of s^ace.
Animals may have the former, "but the conception of an empty, homo-
geneous medium is something far more extraordinary, being a kind of re-
action against heterogeneity which is the very ground of experience".
The faculty of conceiving a space without quality is not the faculty
of abstraction, for that implies the intuition of a homogeneous medium.
"What w^e must say is, that we have to do with two different kinds of
reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other
homogeneous, namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the
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human intellect enables us to use clean cut distinctions, to count,
to abstract and perhaps speak”. (T. F. W. 97) Throughout his argu-
ment, space is conceived as a reality, an empty homogeneous or quality-
less medium. Space is a reality in which things move. It is self-
sufficient, "existing without qualities of bodies”. In this quality-
less, homogeneous medium there is of course neither duration nor real
succession, but simultaneity, repetition. But an empty homogeneous,
medium, devoid of every quality whatsoever, is certainly undistinguish-
able from nothing. It is zero.
"If space is the homogeneous, then any homogeneous and unbounded
medium will be space, for, homogeneity here consisting in the absence
of quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could
be distinguished from one another. Yet time, an unbounded and homo-
geneous medium, is usually distinguished from space; so that the homo-
geneous is supposed to take a double form, according as it is filled
with co-existence or succession. But when we make time a homogeneous
medium, in which conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be
given all at once and therefor 3 lacking duration. Eence time as a
homogeneous medium is a spurious concept; it is time unconsciously
spatialized. Nor can we admit two forms of the homogeneous without
asking whether one is not reducible to the other, and a priori we can
say that the idea of space is the fundamental one. Those philosophers
who have maintained the contrary have failed to see that this bastard
conception of time is a mere phantom of space haunting the reflective
consciousness”. (Kitchin, 59) Thus Bergson reduces this time to
space, and space, as an empty homogeneous medium, without any quality
whatsoever, turns out to be nothing. Consequently this time as an
empty, homogeneous medium, without quality, the time in which, we make
distinctions and in which we count - the time of reilective con-
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sciousness as it is postulated in mechanics - also turns out to be
nothing. • That is, space and time, (abstract time) are nothing as real
itics. (His idea of concrete time will be considered later) Berg-
son can do nothing with space and time as anything else than empty,
qualityless, homogeneous media or nothings. He has more realities
on hand already than he can manage. So that starting with space as
reality, it turns out to be nothing and abstract time also turns out
to be nothing. But this is going too far, for space and time are
not delusions. They have meaning, some kind of reality. Eowne
holds that they are mental forms of experience. Their reality is
phenomenal, not ontological. Eut Eowne would not hold them reducible
to one another, that, is, identical, as Bergson here does. Tor Eowne,
space is one form of mental experience or phenomenal reality and time
is another. The former arises from an experience of co-existence of
things, the lav ter from succession and change.
Although Eergson strips space of all its qualities, he yet
regards it as reality. This would be something like what Eowne calls
pure being and holds non-existent, an empty abstraction. This is what
Eergson* s real space turns out to be when it is regarded apart from the
objects contained in it, that is, apart from experience.
In ’’Matter and Memory" Bergson defines space thus, "Abstract
space is indeed at bottom nothing but the mental diagram of infinite
divisibility", (p. 275) "He must throw beneath the continuity of
sensible qualities, that is to say, beneath concrete extensity, a net
work, of which the meshes may be altered to any shape whatsoever and
become as small as we please; this substratum, which is merely con-
ceived, this wholly ideal diagram of arbitrary and infinite divisi-
bility, is homogeneous space". ( p. 278) What in "Time and
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Free Will" he called solid reality, he now calls a "wholly ideal
diagram", and homogeneous time is described as "a diagrammatic de-
sign of succession in general". Homogeneous time is no longer
regarded as identical with homogeneous space; each retains its
specific characteristic as we said Bowne would consider them. His
conception of homogeneous space as a "wholly ideal diagram" is get-
ting nearer to Bowne' s conception of space as a mental form. His
theory of space in "Creative Evolution" is substantially the same as
that in "Matter and Memory". Space, as a homogeneous and empty
medium, infinite and infinitely divisible, implies a power to carve
reality as we like; this space is the plan of our possible action on
things. It is a view taken by the mind and it enables the mind to
decompose according to any law and to recompose into any system.
(p. 156) Personality descends in the direction of space when the
interpenetration of conscious states becomes broken up and externalized
%
The idea which the mind "forms of pure space is only the schema of the
limit at which this movement would end. Once in possession of the
form of space mind uses it like a net with meshes that can be made
and unmade at will, which, thrown over matter, divides it as the needs
of our action demand. Thus the space of our geometry and the spatial
ity of things are mutually engendered by the reciprocal action and re-
action of two terms (mind and matter) which are essentially the same,
i
but which move each in the direction "inverse of the other . Neither
is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as com-
pletely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it"
.
(C. E. 208) Space is thus a mental schema resulting from the re-
I
ciprocal action of matter and mind and once formed the mind uses it
at will. Things enable the mind to find space which mind could have
found without things if it had sufficient imagination, (p. £02)
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This is not far from the position of Bowne who holds space to be a
j
mental form, it is a form of intelligence in experience with object-
ive reality. It has no other reality. The experience of active
intelligence is its only explanation. Bergson’s real space tends in
spite of him to pass into a mental schema.
As Bergson distinguishes between abstract and concrete time,
so he would distinguish between abstract or ideal space and concrete
space. The former we use for our geometry and the latter we move
in. This distinction he cannot sustain. If one is concretely real,
the other is also. If one is abstract or ideal, likewise the other.
He confuses himself by speaking of "Outside of me" and "Within me"
.
But it is "me" in both cases dealing with the fact of experience, and
"Outside me" and "Within me" cannot be thought of in spatial terms, and
if the idea of space is introduced it certainly is ideal or abstract
space in both cases. We do not need space as real to move in any more
than we need real space to dream in. They are both ideal, phenomenal,
only mental forms, according to Eowne.
Bergson' s idea of space becomes more and more unmanageable for
him except as he reduces it to abstract or ideal space, which is
practically Bowne’s position. When he makes it a hoaiogeneous
,
quality-
less medium, or in other words, nothing, he has gone too far, for space
is not a delusion; and when he attempts to make it a concrete reality,
he has gone too far in the opposite direction and he has all the
difficulties of pluralism on his hands which he cannot manage. Bovne
would suggest some very difficult problems. Wh&t is the relation be-
tween this reality, space, and rhe other realities in it? If it is
real it is infinitely divisible. What binds its parts together and
gives it unity? If it is real it needs space to exist in and so on
in infinite regress. Are things, as we have divided them by the net
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of space, more illusions? This is whax, Bergson’s theory commits him
to. Space as reality must be causal, must do something, but what
does it do? What is its causal effect on things? If space is real
then all reality in space must have bulk as space has, i.e., all be-
comes spatial. Then even life and spirit must have bulk and like
space be infinitely divisible as matter is. What becomes of person-
al individuality? Is a person one or many? Indeed Bergson, as we
have seen, has no other individuality than the organism, a part, in
some way, of the whole, a rivulet off whe stream of life. Now this
rivulet or organism or self like Lhe stream becomes infinitely divisi-
ble, goes to pieces. We have infinite pluralism. How are these
pluralities bound together into system, if system we have? The only
thing or way Bergson offers is the abstraction, continuity . Bergson's
system has been difficult for him to manage aw best, but with real
space it will go to pieces, break up into infinite multiplicity.
Little wonder that Bergson’s idea of space varies as it does. He
wabbles between space as nothing and space as concrete reality, not
being able to remain in either idea of it. The only way out of his
difficulty is Bowne's way out. Personality saves us. Space is a
mental form. It is a phenomenal reality. It is no illusion, it
is not a nothing, nor is it concrete reality. It is not unreal but
it is real only for mind. It does not therefore become a delusion.
Space is still a form of our objective experience and is law giving
for that experience as ever. Our knowledge of space is a mental in-
terpretation of the action of things upon the mind. There is no
need of real space to explain our experience. The realistic view of
space is inconsistent and, upon analysis, even unintelligible. It
hovers between making space something and nothing and both views are
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absurd. It also conflicts with the unity of being and forces us to
regard the infinite as composed of parts. For if space is real, God
as real must be in space and consequently must have bulk and be in-
finitely divisible even as real space is. Spiritual reality as in
space would be as divisible as space. The realistic view of space
involves us in a hopeless dualism of first principles in that it im-
plies two necessary mutually independent principles, which is strictly
impossible. The objective existence of space cannot be proven and the
idea of such space is unclear, inconsistent, impossible. Bowne re-
jects it therefore, for the view that space is ultimately a mental
form or principle of intuition, that is, a category. Space in the
second place is a mode of appearance, but though it is subjective it
is not arbitrary or individual. Space then is phenomenal. It is not
a boundless void in which things exist, but only the general form of
objective experience. ( Bowne-Metaphys ics , 153-154 ) Toward this view
Bergson is more and more compelled by his system and the demand? of ex-
perience. It is the only tenable position.
II. Time
Bergson divides time into the abstract and concrete. Abstract
or ideal time is the time of intellect, of geometry or science. It is
a bastard time due to the intellect’s spatializing duration or concrete
time. Hence like space it is a homogeneous, qualityless medium and
finally identified with space. .And as empty, homogeneous, oualityless,
space is in fact nothing, ideal and abstract time is likewise nothing.
But as we have seen Bergson tries to rescue such space from nothingness
for space cannot be made a nothing, a delusion. And he also differ-
entiates between abstract space and abstract time. Time cannot be
made a nothing and a delusion any more than space can. As we have
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seen his idea of space becomes workable only as it approaches more
and more the idea of Bovne that space is a mental form, a form of ac-
tive intelligence in experience f -.nd apart from the experience of ac-
tive intelligence it is nothing. It is not a delusion but phenomenal
realitj', real only in and for intelligence.
'/that becomes of time in Bergson’ s system? Like space it re-
fuses to be relegated to the realm of nothingness. Bergson tells us
that concrete time as duration is real, the most real, substantial and
resistant stuff we know. It is the very stuff of the psychical life.
Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the
future and swells as it advances. Thus our personality shoots, grows
and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new add-
ed to what was before. Our life is true duration or concrete time.
Duration is active, it does something otherwise it would be nothing.
It is creative.
But we have already pointed out in discussing reality that, as
Bergson progresses from ’’Time and Free Will’ 1 into "Creative Evolution",
duration or concrete time is conceived of more and more as a force of
another Quality or kind. Its temporal quality is less and less prom-
inent as the very stuff of reality, the creative power, the most resis-
tant thing we know. There comes forward, as the creative power, vital
impetus, the elan vital, x-he rushing, pushing, changing, producing,
creating, life current. When we come to his third chapter of "Crea-
tive Evolution" and see and feel this elan at work it seems about to
sweep us off our feet. Until we recover ourselves and our reason, we
are inclined to exclaim, "It is done'. It is sufficient’," But what
has become of duration as time? We find it figuring as a form con-
ditioning the creative efficiency of the elan. It is the form under
which the elan works, very much as, for Borne, time is the form
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of our inner or mental experience. Duration more and more takes on
the nature of his abstract or ideal time. If duration and vital im-
pulse are now used synonomously by him, as they often are, it is with
the character of vital impulse. Otherwise duration has but its tem-
poral meaning as a conditioning form, it is as ideal time, and what
we have already said of this ideal time applies here. Consciously or
unconsciously Bergson has found the problem and work of creation too
great for real time or duration; and, as he sought to make it sufficient
by constant enrichment, it changed its form and nature until it was no
longer what he began with except in name, and he then calls it, accord-
ing to its new nature, elan vital; and duration remains as ideal time,
a form of the working of this elan. Thus he is approaching the view
of Bowne that time is but a mental form of experience and has no
reality or existence apart from the experience of active intelligence
.
It has reality only in and for intelligence
. It is no delusion. It
is phenomenally real.
And the end is not yet. As Bergson has been compelled to enrich
his creative power more and more until it has attained its present
status and nature, and still, as we have already seen, it will not be
sufficient to explain life and thought until it is raised to the plane
of personality, for nothing less can satisfy the demands of sufficient
reason. To make vital impetus or cosmic elan sufficient, means to
raise it to the personal plane, making it active intelligence under
another name. Bergson's real time becomes ideal time the more the
elan is enriched to meet the demands. The nearer the elan annroaches
active intelligence the more sufficient it becomes but also the more
time becomes a form of mental experience. If we are correct in our
treatment of Bergson' s theorjr of time and the elan this is what is
taking nlace in his system which he and his followers say is still in
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the making. It is becoming. As it becomes and changes more and
more it will, we firmly believe, more and more approach Bowne’s posi-
tion. Then will time become the form of the elan’s mental activity
This is the more evident as we consider Bowne's theory of time as he
sums it up:
1 - Time is primarily an order of relations in our experience.
This order admits of no question or denial. (Time is no delusion.)
2 - There is no ontological time separate from things and
events, in which they exist or occur.
3 - There is no order of ontological change of which time is
the form and to which time may be referred, without reference to
intelligence
.
4 - Both time and change must be referred to intelligence as
their source.
5 - Neither time nor change can be carried into intelligence
as such, without making thought impossible. (As we have shown there
must be a permanent, abiding, unitary self to make knowledge possible
Otherwise all is a disorganized flux.)
6 - Neither time nor change can be construed with reference to
an extra-mental fact, but only from the stand-point of self-conscious
intelligence
.
? - Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the range
and contents of self-consciousness.
8 - Non-temporality is not to be conceived as a temporal co-
existence, as if one should say that the earth is on all sides of the
sun at the same time, but rather as the immediate possession of the
objects by the conscious mind. This relation cannot be construed
in temporal terms but must be experienced.
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9 - What this may mean may "be gathered from reflection on
what we call present experience. This is not temporal in the
sense of having a real before and after in it. It is temporal in
the sense of having the temporal form. It is non-temporal in the
sense that the conscious self grasps all its elements in an indi-
visible act and thus makes consciousness possible.
10 - Eut still experience has the temporal form; and we may
resume our temporal language with all confidence, only guarding
ourselves against mistaking this form for an ontological fact, and
also against overlooking the relativity in the temporal judgment
due to our limitation. (Metaphysics, 192)
This is the only tenable position. It gives us all the t ime
we need and the only time we can use. As persons we do not demand
any other time . This theory of time saves us from the problems and
difficulties of pluralism and mechanism. It makes possible a defensi-
ble view of the One and the Many. Bergson seems to be approaching this
position. Time and space more and more tend to become phenomenal,
mental forms, in his system. He can manage them only as they become
such. Eowne’s prophecy that Bergson would yet reach the personal
plane seems well grounded.
-
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VI . freedom and necessity
i
Bergson says we must think of freedom in terms of time, dura-
tion, not of space, as we are so accustomed to do "because we are under
the domination of the reflecting (backlooking)
,
spatializing, material-
izing intellect. Because of this domination by the intellect in-
tension becomes extension-, quality becomes quantity; succession be-
comes simultaneity; or, in short, time becomes space. Spirit is ma-
terialized and we are in the toils of radical mechanism or radical
finalism, which means determination or necessity. The spatial ized
self is not free. To the extent that self is spatialized, it is
necessitated. We are not free when we think, but when we live. The
self of the intellect, under the domination of which we are nearly all
of the time, is not free. This is the material self. It is the spir-
itual self, the self of duration, intuition, that is free. So we are
free only at those rare, brief moments, when, by heroic act of intellect
and will and a twist or wrench of the self, we plunge into the life cur-
rent and, relaxed and reflecting not, are swept along in it and by it.
"Eut rare indeed are the moments when we are self possessed to this ex-
tent: it is then that our actions are truly free". (C. E. 200) We
are free when we live, change and become with the vital impulse which,
sweeping us along, sweeps over us and through us. The self "lives and
develops by means of its very hesitations, until the free action drops
from it like an over ripe fruit". (T. F. V. 176) An act is free, not
because of its spontaneity, but because it is a unique new creation,
the culmination of a personal history, which never repeats itself. It
springs from th.e fundamental self and freedom becomes incredible as
soon as the conscious states are separated or spatialized, for then
«
6 ?
they cease to endure, consequently cease to create, hence are not
free. It is the uniqueness of the psychic state from which the act
springs rhat makes it free. "It agrees with the whole of our most
intimate feelings, thought and aspirations, with that particular
conception of life which is the equivalent of all our past experience,
in a word with our whole personal idea of happiness and of honor",
i.e., it drops as over ripe fruit from our whole life. If we say it
is an effect, it is 'unforeseeable; if it is caused, it cannot be known
as caused. Eergson does not appear to recognize that an act may be
unforeseeable and yet be the result of causes.
His figure of the over ripe fruit is his favorite way of ex-
pressing his idea of freedom. Throughout his system, his conception
of freedom is well expressed by this figure of fruit over ripe dropping
of its own accord. Such an idea of freedom is very different from
that usually held. If our freedom is like that of a fruit tree, it
cannot i>e of much account for those problems of pure ethics which con-
cern Kant and Bowne. "The categorical imperative cannot find here a
resting place if the free act is like a vegetable growth". It is
something that takes place in us and for us rather than anything which
we, of our own spontaneity, will power, choice and effort bring to
pass. Tile gain our freedom by submitting to the vital force, losing
ourselves in the vital current and allowing it to have its way with us.
What then happens in our lives drops as over ripe fruit, not by any-
thing that we have done or been to cause it, but because we lost our-
selves in whe cosmic elan. This idea of freedom differs radically
from that of Bowne, who holds "freedom in our human life to mean the
power of self direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals,
and to work for the realization". (Metaphysics
,
405) Bowne’ s idea
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of freedom enables him to deal successfully with the problem of error
in thinking and the problem of moral responsibility. Eergson’s idea
of freedom destroys the self in the cosmic elan. The spatializing
intellect and what of will we have is used to commit oneself to the
life current and thus achieve freedom by losing self. But. how, what
then happens for us and through us, can be called free and true and
right so far as anything that we do, is something Bergson does not stop
to explain, nor can a follower of Bowne see how it can be called free
and true and right, for, individual initiative, self determination,
self direction, so far as we had them, have been taken from us. There
is no longer independent activity, no ability to weigh, reconsider, de-
cide, etc. liYhatever happens drops from our lives like over-ripe fruit.
As the life current courses through the apple tree until the fruit drops
over-ripe from its branches, without any will or choice or effort on the
part of the tree, so it happens in our lives. The fact that we think
that it is otherwise with us is due to our reflective intellects which
look back on the already done and, spatializing ail, puts the self at the
parting of the ways where we seem to hesitate, plan, weigh, reconsider,
debate, decide and choose. But this is not what happens. Instead
there is unceasing movement, becoming, progress, i. e., duration. This,
as Bov,Tie views it, is not freedom but necessity, for if in this move-
ment, becoming, progress, there is not individual initiative, plan,
choice, purpose, there is necessity and not freedom.
The element of fixity in our nature through our relation to the
world ground, as Bowne conceives it, we have already discussed. Free-
dom is not lawlessness, caprice. The self is not a capricious jumble.
But it has an orderly nature. It is a being of system and law and it
finds its freedom by acting in accordance therewith, as the railway
train finds its freedom on the track which directs it. Act we mus-,

and according to certain fundamental principles of our being or accord-
ing to our nature. Eut it is for us to initiate that action, choose
its direction, give it purpose, weigh our action, consider and recon-
sider it, make mistakes and do wrong, think correctly and incorrectly.
In these possibilities our freedom consists. The results from such
action are the fruits of our freedom, produced by effort, and not
dropping, over ripe, from our lives.
Bergson says this vital impulse or life current is limited, not
by its own choice or determination, but from without. There are things
it would do, but is not able. It is "a limited force which is always
seeking to transcend itself and always remains inadequate to the work
which it would fain produce". "It cannot create absolutely because it
is confronted with matter, that is to say, with the movement that is
the inverse of its own." Matter which is necessity itself limits it.
(C. E. 126, 251, 254) Bergson expresses the limitation of the free-
dom of the vital impulse in the following fine passage: "From our
point of view life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which,
starting from a centre, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole
of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation: at one
single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed
freely. It is this freedom that the human form registers. Every-
where but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man a-
lone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement
indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life
carries in itself. On other lines of evolution there have traveled
other tendencies which life implied, and of which, since everything
Interpenetrates
,
a man ha3
,
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has kept only very limtle. It is as if a vague and formless be in?, whoij
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we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realize him-
self, and had succeeded only ty abandoning a part of himself on the
way." (C. E. 268) This vital impulse finds what freedom it has in
man and this freedom as we have seen is at the expense of man’s freedom.
But this vital current, he tells us, has somehow been interrupted
and turned upon itself and against itself, so that there is now an as-
cending current towards spirit and a descending current of matter toward
pure space. These two currents are in conflict. The ascending cur-
rent is struggling wTith matter to insinuate into it as much indeter-
mination as possible. In this process human beings are formed. What
of success the vital impulse has had in dealing with this current of
matter, it has in human beings and by giv i ng them organisms and a cer-
tainly bodily individuality. In all other directions or efforts in
dealing with this material current, it has been hindered, thwarted more
or less, and, even in man, it has only partially succeeded in coming to
freedom. This material current is able to limit and hinder and deter-
mine more or less the spiritual current. Hence, this spiritual cur-
rent is finite, for no infinite power could be hindered or limited by a
finite power. This limitation of the spiritual current is from without
and contrary to its will and desire and do its best, it cannot overcome
it as it fain vrould do. This limitation is in direct opposition to its
course and desire. This means that it is necessitated, it is not free
and cannot produce a free system or give freedom to its beings or crea-
tures. So that man being the product of this finite, necessitated,
spiritual current, struggling with the material current must be necessi-
tated. For man to have freedom according to Bowne’s idea of freedom
is en Impossibility in Bergson's system, for it is a system of necessity
According to Bowne, freedom in the system demands an infinite, unlimited
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free world-ground. We reach the sane conclusion when we consider
this cosmic elan in the light of the power of force that interrupted
it and turned it upon itself and. against itself. Had the cosmic elan
been infinite it could not have been thus interrupted, and. turned a-
gainst itself. Why should it have been interrupted? Whatever this
interrupting power or force, whether finite or infinite, the cosmic
elan is finite and determined and necessitated by this interruring
agent from which it has never been able to free itself. It is un-
able to turn back the material current toward pure spirit, exeent in
a limited degree in man. Viewed from this stand-point his system
turns out to be one of necessity, hence freedom, as Bowne understands
it, we cannot have.
The bearing of this problem of freedom and. necessity upon thought
is of vast importance. In a system of necessity we cannot raise the
question of truth and error. Whatever is, is, and that is all that can
be 9aid of it. One thing is just as true as another so long as it last
There is no possibility of false propositions and conclusions that are
not true. What we call error is just as necessary as what we call
truth. Things simply run off, are produced, become, result, drop as
over-ripe fruit, and that is all there is of it. That we think, weigh
and debate, reconsider and correct, is a delusion and the delusion is
just as necessary as anything else. The principles of logic are null
and void. There is no clarifying our thought. That we think is a
mistake, the impulse thinks in us, if think it can be called. Truth
and falsehood are one and the same and they drop from us like over-
»
ripe fruit.
The bearing of this problem of freedom and necessity upon respon-
sibility a nd morality is also vastly important. The distinction be-
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tween right and wrong, like that between truth and error, vanishes.
We cannot raise the Question of the rightness or wrongness of any-
thing. If we do raise it, it is because we are predestined to do
so. Whatever is, is, and there is no right or wrong about it.
Our sense of responsibility is a delusion and this delusion like
everything else is a necessity. Bergson has been challenged to
write his system of ethics. Thus far he has not accepted the
challenge, nor can he, unless he gives us a system in which all
moral distinctions are obliterated and no question of responsibility
or of right or wrong is raised. He speaks of motives but how, in
such a system in which finalisai is ruled out and the whole is so
dominated by necessity, can motives be possible or have any meaning?

7o
VII. GOD
In a personal letter Bergson denies that his system is an
atheist monism. He rejects the doctrines which confine themselves
to personifying the unity of nature or the unity of knowledge into
God as motionless first cause. God would really be nothing since he
could no nothing. He says, "The considerations put forth in my
"Essay on the Immediate Data" result, in an illustration of the fact
of liberty; those of "Matter and Memory" lead us, I hope, to put
our finger on mental reality; those of'Creative Evolution" present
creation as a fact: from all this we derive a clear idea of a free and
creating God producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort
is continued in a vital direction, the evolution of species and
the construction of human personalities". (LeKoy p. 224)
In considering Lhe nature of creation by the vital impulse
with its r scending and descending currents he says: "Things and
states are only views taken by our mind of becoming. There are
no things, there are only actions. I find that the automatic and
strictly determined evolution of this well knit whole is action
which is unmaking itself, and the the unforeseen forms which life
cuts out in it, forms 'eatable of being themselves prolonged into
’unforeseen movements, represent the action that is making itself.
Now, I have every reason to believe that the other worlds are
analagous to ours, not all constructed at the same time, since ob-
servation shows me, even today, nebulae in course of concentra.tion.
Now, if the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether it is
that which is unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving
to remake itself, I

simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a center
from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display -
provided however that I do not present this center as a thing
,
but as
a continuity of shooting out. God, thus defined, has nothing of the
ready made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation so
conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we
act freely. In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the in-
verse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter
which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the
life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along
its track". (C. E. 248-24S)
This, in brief, is his idea of God and creation as stated in his
greatest product, chapter three of "Creative Evolution". God is a con-
tinuity of shooting out. He is unceasing life, action, freedom.
He is pure creative activity, not a fountain but a flowing, not a cen-
ter from which things emanate but a continuity of emanation. He is
duration, vital impulse, cosmic elan, immanent and continuous. He is
consciousness in general. He is creative evolution. He has nothing
of the already made. He is becoming, changing, evolving. God is not
yet fully realized but is developing and growing. Pie is the flowing
in which all things flow. He is the current that has been interrupted
and turned upon Himself and against Himself and now is in mighty con-
flict with Himself. He is, without plan or purpose, rushing and
pushing on, driving like Jehu, furiously. He knows not where or why.
He is limited and finite, necessitated by the force or agency that
interrupted Him. This interrupter must be the force or agency that
interrupted Him. This interrupter must be the adversary Satan and, in
the descending current of God, the flowing, we find that he has cre-
ated conflict and strife within the domain of the flowing God. God
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is helpless and fain would overcome this opposition and conflict,
hut is not able.
Such, it seems, are the conclusions at which we must arrive
as to the Nature of God and Eis kingdom, according to Bergson's
system. This is certainly a condition of heterogeneity. It is a
becoming in which God Himself does not know what is going to happen
or what Ee is going to become or what is going to become of Himself.
A bit of finalism, even though it savored of mechanism, would be wel-
come if it would give us some certainty. All is unforeseeable in-
deed and irreversible. It is a phantasmagoric flux. To talk of
freedom in such a God demands that we redefine the word to suit the
conditions. Hew departures are abundant, but not even God knows
what they may be. Miracles, as already said, should be commonplace,
everyday, occurrences. Optimism must become a diminishing quantity,
a descending current whose limit is zero.
Bergson is not an atheist, for he believes in a God and has
given us his idea of that God. However the use of the name, God, is
one thing, and the idea or nature of that God is quite another thing.
So, when Bergson tells us that he believes in God and then goes on to
describe and define that God in terms of duration and vital impetus or
cosmic elan, continuity of shooting out, we discover that while he is a
theist, in the sense of having a God, his God is very different from
the personal God of Bowne, the God who is our Father, immanent yet tran-
scendent, working according to the plan of the whole. Nor can Bergson
be called a monist, for his God has become many. He is a pluralist
and at best his God is first among many. God is finite and limited.
God is in and of the universe as much as the universe is in and of God.
The cosmic elan is not transcendent., but is immanent. Bergson would
be more properly classed as a pantheist than as a monotheist, but it
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is difficult lo classify him at all,
God and because of his God are in a state of becoming and we know
not yet what he shall be, nor what his God shall be. All is in flux.
Nothing has been realized. God and all are yet becoming, evolving,
flowing, changing.
So far, however, we must say that his God is impersonal. It
may become personal. Bowne would call Bergson’s God infra-personal,
but Bergson would say it is supra-personal . Bowne’ s highest ideal
for Bergson's God is that it may become personal. Bergson’s highest
ideal for his own God would seem to be that it may become able to make
all supra-personal. Personality, as Bowne uses it, means self-
consciousness and self-direction, and Bowne' s God possesses these
qualities in the highest degree, and human beings are personal because,
in. varying degrees, they also possess these qualities. They have been
created by God in His own image. But according to Bergson, personality
is a characteristic of human beings in their bodily condition. He re-
fers to the elan as consciousness in general, but to Bowne, conscious-
ness in general is a pure abstraction and in meaningless. The elan
reaches self-consciousness only in man, its point of greatest freedom
and success. Self-direction, this limited elan has only in a degree
nor could it do more without involving itself in finalism, which is
mechanical and necessitated. All that can be said of it is that it
is doing the best it can under the limitations that have been imposed
upon it not of itself. It is working
,
acting, becoming without any
definite plan or goal. Cnly in one instance has it scored a decisive
triumph, that is in man, who, so far, is the crowning achievement of the
evolutionary process. "But man must not be regarded teleologically
as an end, for we cannot say that the evolution of man, as he is, was
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intended when the process "began (for this would imply finalism), and
the accidents incidental to the course of evolution might have made
him very different, even morally, from what he is. At the same time,
he is an end, in that he is the main terminal point which evolution
has reached and a distinct advance upon, and different in kind from,
its other products". (K'itchin) For definite purpose to arise any
where in the process is for all to become to that extent necessitated,
according to Bergson who holds that no fixed end can modify or deter-
mine the process. In a vague way he admits the possibility and
necessity of a degree of finalism, but he fears to let the camel get
his nose into the tent lest he come in and drive his master out, as he
1
surely would in this case. He has no personal God over-ruling and
directing all, but his God is in the changing, flowing process with
'
all things. His God is becoming, so God Himself knows not what He
shall be. "What man shall become we know not^ for evolution is not
complete. What the end is for both God and man, not even God himself
can tell, for all is in a process of becoming. Bergson seems unable
to conceive of God in any other way than such a flow or becoming with-
out making Him an absolute that determines all according to an iron
principle of necessity and in attempting to escape necessity and deter-
mination in this form, he has fallen into necessity in even a worse form,
Bowne’s idea of God as the personal cause of all thifigs culminates
in the conception of God as Father. He is personal, almighty to create,*
II
almighty to sustain and renew. He is in all and over all, God the
Father blessed forever. He works all things according to His will and
purpose a.nd with a loving regard for all his creatures. That all is
complete and exactlv as God would have it, that the end has been
m
reached and nothing more can be done or is doing, this does not imply.
.,
.
,
,
,
.
'
V
*
78
The plan of the whole like the separate products is His and subject to
His control. New departures are possible. Growth and progress are
by Him. Changelessness in Him does not mean rigid fixity that brings
all to a standstill, reduces all to mechanism. His changelessness
means the constancy and continuity of His divine nature which exists
through all the divine acts as their law and source. The change and
permanence of God ean be understood only in terms of personality.
It is His personal nature. He is not lawless, capricious, uncertain.
He has system and order which make life and growth and progress possi-
ble, safe and dependable. He is not a limited, helpless part of His
system. He works freely in His universe which is subject to His free
control. He works and we His sons work with Him. We, with our
personality, may even oppose Him, for we, too, have self-direction and
self-consciousness. But this is not because God is unable, for lack
of powrer, to prevent our doing so, but out of respect for His own work
in our personality, which is subject to His control: out of His respect
for us, His sons whom He is leading into filial relation with Himself.
Optimism can here save itself and hope need not perish from the earth,
.for though we may not be able to understand all things that we see
taking place, we feel sure that back of all and in all and over all is
a God, who is not merely a continuity of shooting out, a capricious
flux, a becoming that has not found itself, but a righteous and all
wise God, who doeth all things well and according to a great plan of
the whole, in which He is able to make all things work together for
good. Bowne does not, as Bergson, judge after the sight of his eyes
or the hearing of his ears. Whatever may be the arguments for opti-
mism and for pessimism in dealing with the problems of evil, to Bowne
the supreme and unanswerable argument for optimism is the incarnation.
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While he used the other arguments, this one of the incarnation meets
the deepest needs of life and makes possible a cheerful, faithful,
courageous, hopeful, righteous life. Such was his idea of the per-
sonal World Ground as God and Father that he believed in, a spirit
of Love and Goodness at the heart of the universe.
"Back of the loaf is the snowy flour,
Back of the flour is the mill,
Back of the mill is the wheat and the shower
And the sun and the Father’s will."
Bourne’s God is a knovable God. He can not be demonstrated but
yet He makes Himself known. His spirit is all around us and within
us. "Nearer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet".
With Him we may hold fellowship. We do not plunge out of ourselves
and lose ourselves in Him to know Him. But as person knows person,
and friend knows friend, and spirit blends wTith spirit, so man as
person may know God as person. This knowledge is not by some spe-
cial faculty but by the whole personality. In this no faculty of the
person is depreciated as being earthy in nature and purpose and unfit
for this richer knowledge, but all, the whole personality, is brought
to this knowledge. Borne does not believe in two or more selves in
us but believes that each of us is a unitary, abiding
,
personal self
created in the image of God and for Him, whom we may know and in whom
we find fullness of life and knowledge.
"0 Love that will not let me go,
I rest my weary soul in Thee;
I give Thee back the life I owe,
That in Thine ocean depths its flow
May richer, fuller be".
.i
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"0 Light that followest all my way,
I yield my flickering torch to Thee;
My heart restores its borrowed ray,
That in the sunshine’s blaze its day
May brighter, fairer, be”.
This he believed, lived and taught. His was a true mysticism that
saved and quickened the self. There is not much in Bergson's idea
of God to inspire enthusiasm and beget hope. There is nothing to
indicate that the pushing, contending force or forces that constitute
his God care any more for their creatures, including human beings,
than the ocean cares for the branches floating on it or the ships that
sail over it. Bowne’s God, who is a Father, cares for human beings as
His children, loves, helps, forgives and keeps them* We are told
that Bergson has not yet expressed himself on the theology of his sys-
tem, so that we do not know what he may say. However that may be,
what his system will permit him to say on this subject as well as on
ethics is quite well forecast by the fundamentals of that system.
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VIII. Immortality
Bergson says, "All our analyses show us, in life, an effort to
remount the incline that matter descends. The life that evolves on
the surface of our planet is indeed attached to matter. If it were
pure consciousness, a fortiori, if it were supra-consciousnees
,
it
would be pure creative activity. in fact, it is riveted to an or-
ganism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But
everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free
from these laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of
physical changes. It does, however, hehave absolutely as a force
would behave, which, left to itself, would work in the inverse direc-
tion. Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downward
it succeeds in retarding it". (C. E. 245) "In the organized world,
the death of individuals does not seem at all like a diminution of life
in general or like a necessity which life submits to reluctantly. Life
has never made an effort to prolong indefinitely the existence of the
individual, although on so many other points it has made so many success
ful efforts. Everything is a_s if this death had been willed or at
least accepted for the greater progress of life in general". (C. E.
24?, note) "That matter that it (the life current) bears along with
it, and in the interstices of which it inserts itself, alone can divide
it into distinct individualities. On flows the current, running
through human generations subdividing itself into individuals. This
subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made
clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created which
nevertheless in a certain sense preexisted. They are nothing else
than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself,
flowing through the body of humanity." (C. E. 269)
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"As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with out entire solar sys-
tem, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is
materiality itself, so all organized beings from the humblest to the
highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are,
and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion,
the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All
the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push.
The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and
the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army
galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming
charge able to beat down every resistance and. clear the most formidable
obstacles perhaps, even death". (C. E. 271)
From these quotations we see what we have already seen so many
times in considering Bergson, the ascending current of this vital
impulse contending with the descending current of materiality in an
effort to insinuate into it as much indetermination as possible. In
this is is but partially successful. However, as a result of the
effort, human beings are formed who are loaded with matter a.nd riveted
to matter. These human beings have their individuality by virtue of
this bodily organism. They had a certain preexistence in the life
current, but not individuality. This became theirs only when they
were thrown off into matter as rills from the life current, apart from
these bodily conditions, the only thing chat seems to be for them is
to be reabsorbed in the life current, and this life current, which has
succeeded do well in many other ways, seems to have no special desire
or interest in maintaining this relation to the bodily organism which
constitutes the human individual. Its interest as a life current
would seem, according tp Bergson, to be better served by this bit or
t,
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part of itself, which it has thrown off into a bodily organism, being
reabsorbed into itself again. This withdrawing itself from the bodily
organism is what we call death. The only hope of these beings or rills
maintaining their individuality is, that somehow, as in a mighty caval-
ry charge, they may overcome and seat down all obstacles and prevent
this reabsorption or death or retard it and delay it as long as possi-
ble. From all this, if we understand Bergson's figures aright, for
he is here very profuse in figures, he conceives that it might be pos-
sible somehow to continue this bodily existence forever if we can
only spiritualize matter, turn back the descending material current.
But so far the vital impulse has only partially succeeded in this and
at best has only retarded its descent for a time, as the live stream
does the condensed descending drops. Failing to do anything else it
has withdrawn from matter and been reabsorbed into itself. Bergson’s
idea of immortality then seems to be a forever continued bodily ex-
istence which so far has been impossible. Failing in this the best
he has to offer is reabsorption in the main current and loss of per-
sonal identity. Then the current sweeps on all and alone, having
swallowed up ail its creatures as the sea swallows its waves. It is
not a very inspiring hope that Bergson’s system holds out. We have
little prospect of being able to outride bodily death very long how-
ever furiously we may make the charge. Failing in this sooner or
later, as all have done, matter fells, the little rill is dried up,
the sea has taken back its water, the vital current has taken back
the bit of life and we are no more as individual persons, unless, as
a bit of the current, we are incarnated again in some organism, plant,
animal or man.
The world ground and God of Bowne is personal, and human beings
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are His children and are also personal. They are His creation.
Their individuality is not bodily but spiritual. Their individuality
is their personality. The soul of man and his body are related in the
sense that the body is the instrument of the soul. Each conditions
and effects the other, but there is no reason to believe that Clod de-
stroys the soul when the body fails and dies. Individuality and per-
sonality being spiritual and not of the bodily why should we believe
that the God, who created this soul, this individual or person, and
for a time gives it a bodily organism for its earthier existence, will
destry it when the bodily organism is destroyed? This soul is not a
little rill thrown off from the nature of God as from a great river,
but is His distinct creation. If it preexisted, it did not preexist
in God as the rill preexists in the river, but it preexisted in His
great plan and purpose and is His outright creation in His own image.
Eowne's personal philosophy leads easily and naturally to this conclu-
sion. It is not something he forces into his system. His philosophy
of personalism naturally consummates in the thought of God as Father
and human beings as His children, whom He has begotten in His om image
and whom He will not destroy or blot out when the bodily organism no
longer serves rhe needs of His spiritual child. Eowne’s faith and hope
in immortality, growing directly out of his philosophy, were strong.
For him, death had no sting and no fear. It meant to him not the being
blotted but more distinct individuality, richer personality, more abun-
dant life. In a funeral address he said, "We see death only from the
outside. The body, which has been the means of expression and com-
munication, ceases its work, and we say our friend is dead. Eut this
only means that we have no further intercourse with him. There is no
answering pressure of the hand., and t-he loving voice is stix*. ^et.
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oar friend lives, nevertheless; for all live unto God. Somewhere
in God’s kingdom he is engaged in the activities and has the exper-
iences which belong to that unseen realm. And all the while he and
we are in the hands of our Father
.
Love met us and prepared the way when we came into this life;
similarly love meets us when we pass into the next life and prepares
the way for us there. Death, then, is only an incident in the exist-
ence of an immortal spirit, a passage from a lower to a higher phase
of our continuous life. All the successive phases of this life of
ours are comprised in the divine thought, and are gathered up in one
great plan of love and wisdom.
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IX . Bergson ana the Social Problems
The supreme test of any philosophy is its ability to deal sat-
isfactorily with the experiences and problems of every day life.
The acid test, "By their fruits ye shall know them", is as applicable
to systems of philosophy as to persons. To fail in dealing with the
world of experience is to fail just when they should succeed. To my
mind nothing so reveals the insufficiency of Bergson’s philosophy as
his application of it to the social problems. As a closet affair, it
is one thing; as method of explaining and dealing with daily affairs
among men it is altogether another matter. This test applied by
Bergson himself makes this one of the most unsatisfactory chapters in
this essay. But he himself is responsible for it. We will let him
speak for himself. He shall be judged out of his own mouth. His
own words here sustain what we have been saying about his system.
What then has "The Philosophy of Change" to say of the social
problems? Kov; does Bergson conceive of them, their nature, cause
and solution? How would he himself apply his system to them? These
questions naturally suggest themselves. From what we have seen of
Bergson’s interpretation of life we feel that we know quite well what
his system would permit him to say upon these as well as upon other
subjects. Fortunately (or unfortunately) he himself has spoken on thi
very matter in an address before the French Academy of Moral and Foliti
cal Science dealing with the European war. In this address he holds
to the theory of the vital impetus or life current divided into two op-
rosins? currents, one of intellectuality and materiality and the other
of spirituality. These two currents or forces of matter and spirit
are ir. terrible, deadly conflict. Of course Germany is intellect and
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matter, and the allies are spirit, because Bergson is a Frenchman.
Spirit is trying to turn back matter and insinuate into it as much
indetermination as possible. It is of the very nature of matter in
its downward course to oppose spirit in its upward course. As re-
ported by the Paris Figaro and translated for the Literary Digest of
January 23, 1915, he said: "We see in the present climax of events the
death grapple between an intelligence of perfect mechanism and an
intelligence of the spirit. Man's magic craftsmanship with the
scientific and mechanical arts suddenly greatly enlarged his physical
being - so suddenly that his soul has not kept pace with it. Certain
moral and social problems resulted, to solve which most of the world
bent its energies. But there were those who were tempted to try the
experiment not of spiritualization of matter, but of the mechanization
of mind. Thus, instead of attaining to a higher civilization through
our mastery of science, the peoples of the earth would be subjected to
a new barbarism worse than the original, which at least contained the
germ of civilization. The German nation, militarized by the Prussians,
was predestined to make this venture. Many years to come, when the
present has withdrawn so far into the past that one can see only the
larger outlines of these days, a philosopher will perchance analyze
them as follows: He will say that the notable idea of the nineteenth
century to employ science for the satisfaction of our material needs
had given the mechanical arts an unexpected range and procured for man
in less than fifty years more tools than he had made in the thousands
of years he had hitherto passed on earth. Each new machine was a new
organ for man - an artificial organ, to prolong the term of his natural
organs. In consequence, his body became suddenly and prodigiously
enlarged, and his soul could not dilate rapidly enough entirely to
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contain this new body. Out of the disproportion rose moral, social,
and international problems, which the majority of peoples sought to
solve by removing discrepancies, by working toward greater liberty,
greater fraternity, and greater justice than world had ever before
known. Then while humanity was engaged in this great work of civil-
ization, inferior powers - I had almost said 'infernal* - were trying
the inverse exp e riment
.
"What would happen if the mechanical forces which had been
brought to the point where they could be put at the service of man
should master him and convert, him into their materiality? What would
become of the world if this mechanism should take possession of all
humanity, and if the races, instead of lifting themselves freely to a
diversity richer and more harmonious, as persons, should sink into
uniformity, as things? What would a society be like that obeyed
automatically an order automatically transmitted; which should rule
with its science and its view of things, and which should have lost
with the sense of justice the idea of truth? What would such s.
humanity be like in which brute force obtained instead of moral force?
What new barbarism, this time a. definitive one, wnuld result to stifle
sentiments, idea, in a word, civilization, which ancient barbarism
held in the germ? Yfhat would happen, to sum up finally, if the moral
effort of humanity should turn upon itself at the moment it reached
its term, and if by some diabolical artifice it should produce, in-
stead of a spiritualization of matter, a mechanization of mind?
"The Germans were predestined to prove the experiment. Here
vms a powerful nation whose administrative and military mechanism be-
came, with the combination of the industrial mechanism, a machine
/
capable of subjugating other peoples and making them prisoners of the
-'
; ;
,
,
r
,i • '
.
•
.
'
,
.
.
- •
,
,
.
'
.
I
, X f
. .
ii
1
, ,
,
.
,
89
mechanism that controlled Germany. This would be the precise
meaning of war, whenever Germany was ready to declare it. She did
declare war, but the result was quite different from what she expected.
The moral forces that were to be subjected to that power of nearest
kin to matter suddenly revealed themselves as creators of material
force. A simple idea, the heroic conception of a little people as to
what honor was, enabled it to hold up its head before a mighty Empire.
At the cry of outraged justice, there sprang from the soil, in a land
that had hitherto depended on its fleet, one million, two millions, of
soldiers; in a nation believed to be mortally rent within itself, from
one day to the next all became brothers.
"Thenceforward the issue was not in doubt. On one side there
was the force spread upon the surface; on the other, the force drawn
from deep roots. On one side, the mechanism, the thing all made, which
cannot repair itself; on the other, life, power of creation, which
makes and remakes itself at each instant. On one side, that which
exhausts itself; on the other, that which does not. In truth, the
machine did exhaust itself. long it resisted, slowly it toppled
,
then
suddenly fell to pieces. Under it, alas, many of our children were
crusht; and over the fate of these youths, who were so naturally and
so simply the most heroic of all youths, we still shed our tears...
"An implacable law insists that the spirit must set itself
against the resistance of matter, that no advance be made in life
except at the cost of life, and that great moral results are bought at
the cost of much blood and many tears. but this time the sacrifice
shall be as fruitful as it has been beautiful. That they might
measure up with life in a supreme combat, destiny had brought together
at one point all the powers of death - and lo, death was vanquished.
Through material suffering, humanity was saved from the moral fall
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that would have meant the end. Joyous in their desolation, amid
mourning and ruin, the nations intoned the song of deliverance."
Here is plainly evident the same idea of the life current, its
ascent and descent, its material and spiritual natures and their
conflict, which we have noted so many times in Eergson’s philosophy.
Here again the principle of necessity which also we have noted many
times in Bergson’s system. He openly expresses it. "Germany was
predestined to make this venture". She is so materialized, so com-
pletely in the. grip of matter that she could not do otherwise.
She is the falling black rocket that in vain the ascending burning
rocket, the allies, struggles .with. She is the condensed, falling
steam with which the live steam, the allies, can only retard but not
turn into live rising steam again. She is the interrupted current
which has been turned back and against the spiritual current, the
allies. Bui, why is she predestined any more than the allies? They,
the rising spiritual current, are as surely predestined to do what
they are doing, for it is the mighty pushing of the vital impulse that
is driving all along as a furious, terrible, cavalry charge. All are
predestined, the Germans, as matter, to fall and oppose the allies,
ana the allies, as spirit, to rise and oppose the Germans. The one
is no more to be praised than the other is to be blamed. The inherent
nature of matter is to tend downward, it is naturally evil. The
inherent nature of spirit is to tend upward, it is naturally good.
Bux, when predestination rules, moral distinctions drop out. Hence in
this case as in ail others we have irresponsible forces in deadly com-
bat and none can prsise and none can blame. It must be so. These
things must need come bux we cannot say "Woe unto them through whom
they come", for they could not do otherwise. This war need excite no
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wonder or surprise. We may expect anything to happen according to
Bergson's system with its plurality of contending forces having no
over ruling and directing power guiding them to an end according to a
plan of the whole. But according to him all is order, if not one
kind, then another. It is all in the way we look at it.
According to Bergson's theory of matter, the outlook for the
allies is dark. Tor the Best that the rising current of spirit so
far has Been aBle to do with the falling current of matter is not to
turn it Back But for a time to retard it. Sooner or later it con-
tinues its downward course. The rising current is limited,
fain would do much more and otherwise, But it is not aBle. Matter
and intellect dominate except at those rare, Brief intervals when
spirit has right of way and there is freedom. This rushing, pushing
vital impulse as in a mighty cavalry charge may overcome all difficult-
ies and Beat down every oBstacle, and conquer all enemies - even death
itself, But so far it has not Been aBle to do so. hill it Be aBle
to do so in this war? Bergson evidently thinks it will. Cf course
if Bergson were a German the order of these warring nations would
doubtless Be reversed. So it turns out to Be a matter of view point
or nationality as to which is spirit and which matter. here he a
German there is every reason to Believe that order would Be reversed,
the Germans would Be spirit and the allies, intellect and matter.
But no sufficient philosophy can Be a matter of personal, private,
selfish interpretation. It must Be as applicable to one side as the
other, as sufficient for one as the other. It must equalljr include
all without selfish prejudice.
There is every reason to Believe that the interpretation Berg-
son has given this war is the interpretation he would give all social
questions. All turn out to Be a terrible conflict Between matter
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and spirit which has been brought about by some interrupter, some
adversary, some Satan. Eergson's pluralism is here manifest and he
is unable to solve these problems, to manage these clashing forces,
these blind Samsons in deadly combat. The kingdom of his C'od in-
spires little enthusiasm and hope. It is but the terrific clash of
vital but unpersonal forces.
Bowne may $ot be any more than Bergson to furnish a definite
detailed solution for these problems of society, but by giving us a
personal world ground, who is God the Father, who is infinite,
righteous, wise and good, and holds all things in the grasp of His
power, he makes possible a way of looking at these problems which
begets hope and courage. The God of Bowne has not been thrown into
conflict within Himself by some external interruption. Matter is
His as well as spirit and He is able to make them work together for
good. The world has not gotten away from Him nor been taken from
Him, so that in His finiteness and externally imposed limitation there
is much He fain would do but is unable. Such a C-od and condition is
far different from mighty, but finite, limited force? clashing and
grinding and destroying with no plan or purpose like mighty beasts
fighting in the dark trying to work out a modus vivendi. It is the
God of Jesus in whom Bowne' s philosophy more and more led him to be-
lieve what brings light to these dark, perplexing problems. "In
Him was life and the life was the light of men". "As many as received
Him to them He gave the power to become the children of God," It is
in this God, not Bergson’s, that we find hope.
If we accept Bergson's idea of God, the terrible conditions in
Europe should excite no wonder. They are what we should most
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naturally expect with his two mighty currents struggling in con-
flict with one another. Harmony and peace would he the rare, yea,
impossible, exception. That there should be ferocious anc deadly
struggle and conflict in men and in society and in nature would
be the normal condition of affairs. Nietzsche would be vindicated.
The wronder would be that conditions are as good as they are and not
tenfold worse.
Eut we can not admit such a God and such conditions without
doing violence to our nature, our very being, without surrendering
our ideals. be know such conditions should not exist, hence we
justly condemn them. it is the God of Eowne that we turn to save
ourselves and the world. lie is our hope. To Him wall wre pray, for
pray and hope v/e must. In Him and not in a center of shooting out,
a flowing, a stream of clashing forces, do wre find powrer to live
and work out our salvation, to serve, to sacrifice, to suffer, and to
die in hope. Bergson’s God cannot save Himself, why then should wre
look to Him for help? His God is struggling in a process of becoming
and is doing the best He can, all He can. He cannot deliver us.
It is the God of Eowne
,
who can answer the cry of the soul from its
depths. "Our help cometh from God who made heaven and earth and all
that is in them," the God who is our personal Fsther. He is our
hope for the kingdom of righteousness, peace and joy.

94
v
X, Elements of Value in Bergson
. . . , — — —— - . . -
It might seem from the preceeding chapters that we find little
or nothing in Bergson's philosophy to commend. Such is not the case.
It eontains much wotth while. We have attempted to point out the
elements of weakness. These, according to Bowne's system, are cor-
dinal. If Bergson comes to personalism most of what has been said
loses its force. But so long and so far as he remains on the imperson-
al or unpersonal plane we hold the foregoing objections valid. It is
noticeable that those who find most in Bergson to commend seem to
assume that his philosophy is personal or becoming so. Eowne himself,
as we have already stated, felt that Bergson's system would finally
become personal if he would consistently complete his philosophy. As
long as elan vix-al is other than a person his system is mechanical,
consequently deterministic, nor can it be otherwise. It is a system
of becoming and will not be sufficient until it becomes fundamentally
personal. His tendency seems to be toward the personal, as Bowne used
that term. The personal continually gets into his philosophy. It is
because he thus slips over into the personal and consciously or un-
consciously brings in the personal as cause or result that his sustem
has such strength.
In the light of this we will mention three great values of his
philosophy. There are others, but these will suffice to indicate his
strength and point where we may expect help from him in the future.
First
,
Fie starts, not with matter force and motion, but with
life, vital impulse, as the fundamental cause of all things. This is
3
a great advance. Gross materialism is rules
man has more surely given the death blow to
materialistic sbhool than Bergson has done.
out as insufficient. Ho
Spencer and others of the
He has cut away all their
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ground. He shows conclusively that matter, force and motion can
never account for life, intelligence, spirit. This a contribution is
of great value to philosophy. He has done this so thoroughly that it
need not be done again. In this he is at one with Bowne who did this
same work with equal if not greater effectiveness
,
years ago
.
But, as we have contended, vital impulse does not go far enough;
it is not sufficient to account for intelligence personality. ‘If
matter, force and motion are insufficient as the God and Creator of all
things, so is vital impulse, so long and so far as it comes short of
personality, i.e. self consciousness and self direction. The same
objections Bergson brings against matter, force and motion are largely
valid against vital impulse. 'Chile the chasm between matter, force and
motion and spiritual life, i.e. personality, may be greater than the
chasm between vital impulse and personality, the latter chasm is just
as difficult to bridge from the side of vital impulse as from that of
matter, force and motion. In both cases we land in the bottomless
abyss. Vital impulse is an advance but it stops abort. It is kind of
a half-way place. As matter force and motion earn not save even them-
selves, far less the universe, but must be saved by personality, so
neither can vital impulse save itslef and the universe. Ho man is more
able than Bergson to show. Now it is sufficient for these things, but
even he has not yet done so, nor can he do so, according to Bowne. Y’e
can never get back to materialism with the work which Bergson has done,
¥e trust he will soon pass on from vitalism to personalism as the only
sufficient system.
Second
,
his doctrine of change recognizes and seeks to make a
place for growth, productivity
,
novelty. He recognizes the facts of
science and the needs of life. A system of rigid fixedness, whether
absolute materialism or absolute idealism, will never do. a radical
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finalism that closes all doors a head of us is as impossible to
satisfy the needs of life as a gross materialism that closes all
doors back of us. The latter would keep us from coming and the former
keeps U3 from going. Stern identity would prevail. Eut the facts of
life, all science, are against such identity. There is change and
there must be change. The way must be kept open for progress, be-
coming and developments . This Bergson recognizes and mightily em-
phasizes. Bo anxious is he to provide a way for such change and be-
coming that he opens the door wide enough for everything and anything
to happen. All is change, flux, becoming. What it will become there
is no telling. It is not guided from before but it is mightily pushed
from behind. Vital impulse is driving furiously with no goal in view.
It seems nothing but purposeless change.
Bergson secs this and would correct it by introducing a certain
degree of finality or purpose in this becoming. Thus he would save
us from aimless becoming. Eadical finalism, true, is radical deter-
minism* I.o finalism is mere chance, chaos. Some finality indeed there
must be. Purpose must be from the beginning or must ouse on the way,
or all is but Raleido-scopic happenings. But now get any finality into
such a system with vital impulse less than personality? Cr hew keep
it from being rigidly determined if any determinism is admitted?
Bergson gets in some purpose because consciously or unconsciously he
smuggles personality into vital ' impulse . if personality is not in
vital impulse from the beginning, in can not be gotten out of it any
more than personality can be gotten out of matter, force and motion.
Bowne rightly holds that persohality and that alone is sufficient to
provide for change and purpose, finality and progress. In personality
alone we have sufficient identity to give firmness, steadiness, direc-
tion. In personality alone we have provision for change, becoming,

9 ?
without its being groundless and purposeless.
Bergson has rendered more valuable service in his doctrine of
change and finalism. Change there must be; purpose there must be.
Although he has not made adequate provision for these in vital impulse,
he has made us see and feel the problem as never before and has led
along the way toward the solution and has pointed us toward the end
which according to Bowne is personalism.
Third
,
Bergson's doctrine intuition, to my mind his greatest
contribution, has puv all philosophy and theology under obligation to
him. Intuition, according to him, is knowing by immediate experience,
by life in communion with life, as valuable and necessary as is know-
ledge gained by hearsay, by external ideas of intellect, by concepts,
this knowledge is superficial, external, insufficient. Bull, deep,
vital knowledge can be gained only by intuition, by experience of
reality, communion, fellowship with reality. _¥e must enter into
reality. It is not our grasping reality by concepts which are but
snapshots of reality, but it is letting reality grasp us, take us into
its embrace. This is possible. Thus we may know, may experience elan
vital, thus only can we truly, fully, deeply know it, thus we experience
it. The value of intuition to philosophy and especially to religion
is apparent at once. The limits of intellectualism is made very evident
and plain by Bergson. But he does not, as Bent and Spencer, land us in
the darkness and despair of the unknowable. Bent of course tried to
get us out because life demanded it, but the world of pBiilosophy has
never been satisfied with his deliverance. Certain kinds of mysticism
have tried, but they left us suspended in mid air, unable to go up or
come down. Bergson, b^.r his doctrine intuition, has shown us how we may
have deep, rich, Tital knowledge of reality without violence to our-
selves. Of course there is much yet to be done, but Bergson has set up
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far on the way. lie has given philosophic grounding to the doctrine of
knowledge of God by experience, witness of the spirit, religious assur-
ance. We may know God by personal experience, we may fellowship with
Him, we may enjoy Him, we may know that He receives us, forgives, ap-
proves us. Our love for God and God’s love for us, faith, the yield-
ing of self to God, friendship with God the Father, the fundamental,
primal Reality, the Creator must be philosophically recognized as pos-
sible and valid according to Bergson’s doctrine of intuition. This
deepens and enriches all life, knowledge and experience, and will abide
as one of the greatest contributions ever made to philosophy.
/
These three principles in Bergson’s system are of great
and permanent worth. They are all away from materialism and toward
spiritualism. They indicate the direction philosophy is taking.
Bergson is surely moving toward personalism. He has certainly made
it most difficult, if not entirely impossible, for philosophy go back
of his system. He has made some positions forever untenable. If we
can not rest in his present position, which his very doctrine of change
precludes, we must go forward, and, if forward, whither but to person-
alism? No one has done more to make every other position untenable
than Eerg 3on
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